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Article 4

EMBRACING TRADITION: PLURALISM IN
AMERICAN FAMILY LAW
ANN LAQUER ESTIN*

Courts deciding family law disputes regularly encounter unfamiliar ethnic, religious, and legal traditions, including Islamic and Hindu
wedding celebrations, Muslim and Jewish premarital agreements, divorce arbitration in rabbinic tribunals, and foreign custody orders entered by religious courts. On one level, this is not at all surprising:
millions of Americans identify themselves as members of minority cultural and religious traditions, including Judaism, Islam, Buddhism,
Hinduism, and hundreds of others.1 At the same time, the question
of multiculturalism in this context is something of a surprise, as we are
used to understanding contemporary family law as secular and

universal.2
This Article explores the problem of cultural and religious pluralism in American family law, focusing on the courts' efforts to understand and accommodate diverse traditions in the context of specific
disputes. The cases discussed in this Article emphasize both the particularity of our legal tradition and the broader variety of American
family practices. Courts and judges take the parties to these disputes
as they find them, with all the specificity and complexity of their personal circumstances. Following the pragmatic tradition of family law,
* Professor of Law, University of Iowa College of Law. A.B., Dartmouth College; J.D.,
University of Pennsylvania. My thanks go to several colleagues for their help, including
Randy Bezanson, Jill Gaulding, Linda Kerber, and Mary Welstead. Thanks also to my student research assistants, especially Jocelyn Cornbleet. An early version of this article was
presented at the International Society of Family Law Eleventh World Conference on Family Life and Human Rights, August 2-7, 2002, in Copenhagen and Oslo.
1. Weighted estimates based on data for 2001 collected by the American Religious
Identification Survey showed that 1.3% of the population (2,831,000) described their religious identification as Jewish, 0.5% (1,104,000) as Muslim, 0.5% (1,082,000) as Buddhist,
and 0.4% (766,000) as Hindu. BARRY A. KOSMIN ET AL., AMERICAN RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION SURVEY 13 (Dec. 19, 2001), available at http://www.gc.cuny.edu/studies/aris.pdf. By
comparison, 24.5% (50,873,000) described their orientation as Catholic and 16.3%
(33,830,000) as Baptist. Id. at 12. Note that these numbers reflect current religious identification, rather than background or birth. Many Americans do not affiliate themselves
with any religious group. Id. at 10.
2. While different beliefs are accorded constitutional respect, cultural and religious
practices that conflict with prevailing cultural norms are often not protected. See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884-85 (1990) (finding that a generally applicable
statute criminalizing the possession of peyote was not unconstitutional as applied to Native
American religious use).
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the courts respond to each unique situation with the doctrinal tools
available. Working from these cases and from the concrete experiences of real families, it is possible to sketch broader outlines of a
more international and multicultural family law practice and to note
several points of particular difficulty.
A pluralistic approach to family law reflects a contemporary understanding of our society as a diverse and multicultural one, and of
the family as central to the establishment of identity and meaning in
private life.3 It is based on a commitment to inclusion and respect for
difference, grounded in our political and constitutional values of
equality, nondiscrimination, and religious freedom. At the same time,
because pluralism is a practice situated within the larger framework of
a specific legal tradition, the process of accommodating diverse traditions is subject to constraints imposed by the same fundamental values. The cases discussed here implicate general norms of equality and
due process, as well as the protective policies that form the foundation
for our particular rules of family law. Many of these values draw further support from emerging principles of international human
rights.4
Developing a multicultural family law is complicated by several
further challenges. The first of these is definitional. Culture and tradition are complex and variable, difficult to define, and easily subject
to misunderstanding and caricature. Just as there are differences between Quaker and Episcopal wedding services, there are many varieties of Hindu marriage celebrations, many schools of Islamic legal
interpretation, and many degrees ofJewish observance. Cultural practices change over time and across geographic space. Beyond these
differences, there are questions of personal identity, equally complex
and fluid, and essential to the resolution of particular cases. Family
3. Accommodation of diverse family traditions has been a complex problem in both
criminal law and family law. See generally Austin Sarat & Roger Berkowitz, Disorderly Differences: Recognition, Accommodation, and American Law, 6 YALE J.L. & HumAN4. 285, 291-304
(1994) (discussing the Supreme Court's treatment of polygamy and Amish educational
practices). These issues are particularly controversial in the contexts of domestic violence
and child abuse. See Holly Maguigan, Cultural Evidence and Male Violence. Are Feminist and
Multiculturalist Reformers on a Collision Course in Criminal Courts?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 36, 41
(1995) (discussing treatment of cultural differences in domestic violence and child abuse
cases); see also Cassandra Terhune, Comment, Culturaland Religious Defenses to Child Abuse
and Neglect, 14J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAw. 152, 165-67, 172-76 (1997) (discussing the
cultural defenses of parents who refuse medical treatment for their children on religious
grounds).
4. See generally Ann Laquer Estin, Families and Children in InternationalLaw: An Introduction, 12 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBs. 271, 300-06 (2002) (describing provisions of
human rights law establishing a normative framework for domestic and international family law).
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members may disagree about the meaning or interpretation of a particular practice or the level of adherence to tradition they wish to
maintain.
A second source of complexity is the boundary between church
and state in our legal tradition. 5 Because family law is understood to
be secular, the blend of legal and religious authority over family life in
other traditions poses a dilemma for American courts. Denying enforcement of a marital agreement signed by two individuals in a religious context might infringe their free exercise rights, but interpreting
and enforcing such an agreement on the basis of religious law verges
dangerously on an establishment of religion.6
In light of these dilemmas, the task for courts and lawmakers in
these cases is not to construct and apply a series of legal rules applicable to Hindu weddings, Islamic marriage contracts, orJewish divorces.
Rather, the challenge is to elaborate broader legal principles that allow individuals greater freedom to express their cultural or religious
identity and negotiate the consequences of these commitments. By
establishing this framework, courts can make space for traditions to
flourish, and at the same time, protect the rights of individuals to full
membership and participation in the larger political community.
I.

DEFINING BOUNDARIES

Although American family law was once based explicitly on Christian principles, our political and legal institutions are today committed to an ideal of religious neutrality. As a result, we often ignore or
deny the religious underpinnings of our family law system. These
roots explain some of the cultural gap between our legal tradition and
the traditions of other groups. Beyond specific differences, the secularized American tradition contrasts sharply with systems in which
family regulation is a matter of personal status regulated by religious
courts or religious law.
A.

Religion and American Family Law

Marriage in England was regulated by the Roman Catholic
Church from about the twelfth century until the English Reformation
in 1534, and then by the Anglican Church until the mid-nineteenth
century.7 Throughout this period, ecclesiastical law controlled the re5. See infra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 176-218 and accompanying text.
7. See HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

21-25 (2d ed. 1988) (describing the historical and religious basis of marriage and how
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quirements for marriage, rules for solemnization, and the circumstances in which parties might be permitted to live separately. 8 The
Church recognized informal marriages until Lord Hardwicke's Act
was passed in 1753, requiring publication of banns, a license, and a
church ceremony.9 Civil marriage ceremonies were not possible until
the Marriage Acts of 1836 and 1898,10 and English ecclesiastical courts
retained authority over annulment and divorce until the Matrimonial
Causes Act of 1857, when jurisdiction was transferred to the civil
courts." Because there were no ecclesiastical courts in the American
colonies, the regulation of marriage was taken up by secular authorirules, however, was drawn from Enties. 2 The content of1 marriage
3
glish ecclesiastical law.
In the United States, parallels still exist between the ecclesiastical
and present-day rules governing the consent required for marriage
and the impediments to marriage.' 4 Although these rules now appear
to be entirely secular, their religious character is apparent on closer
examination. For example, very broad rules in the Roman Catholic
ecclesiastical law, prohibiting certain marriages on grounds of consanguinity or affinity, were narrowed in England 1540 to a shorter list
based on the Bible's Levitical degrees.1 5 This list was revised again in
the twentieth century.' 6 The American states are divided on this
point, with some states retaining a relatively wider range of prohibitraditions and attitudes toward marriage have changed over the years); see alsoJOHN WIrE,
JR., FROM SACRAMENT TO CONTRACT: MARRIAGE, RELIGION, AND LAW IN THE WESTERN TRADI-

154, 202-04 (1997).
8. See CLARK, supra note 7, at 22, 125, 406-07.
9. Id. at 23. The Marriage Act exempted Quakers, Jews, and members of the Royal
Family. MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 66 (1985). In Roman Catholic countries, informal marriages
were abolished by the Council of Trent in 1563. Joseph M. Snee, The Canon Law of Marriage: An Outline, 35 U. DET. L.J. 309, 357 (1958).
10. See WITTE, supra note 7, at 202; NIGEL LOWE & GILLIAN DOUGLAS, BROMLEY'S FAMILY
LAw 36-37 (9th ed. 1998).
11. CLARK, supra note 7, at 407 & n.21.
12. Id. at 408.
13. See id. at 408-09 (noting the adoption of ecclesiastical defenses to divorce by American courts). For the evolution of marriage rules in the United States, see GROSSBERG, supra
note 9, at 64-152.
14. Id. at 23; see also Snee, supra note 9, at 322-56 (discussing ecclesiastical law).
15. CLARK, supra note 7, at 82-83 (citing Leviticus 18:6-18). The prohibitions included
marriages of parties "related both by blood and by marriage in the ascending and descending line, brothers and sisters, uncles and nieces and aunts and nephews." Id. at 83; see also
SEBASTIAN POULTER, ENGLISH LAW AND ETHNIC MINORITY CUSTOMS 8-11 (1986). Ironically,
the Jewish tradition, based on the same biblical authority, permits marriage between an
uncle and niece, while the English ecclesiastical law does not. Id. at 9.
16. CLARK, supra note 7, at 83 & n.24.
TION
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tions."7 These differences generate difficult conflict of laws questions,
and courts deciding such questions have found themselves enmeshed
in a debate about natural law, struggling to analyze in secular legal
terms a problem based on religious doctrine.'" These impediments to
marriage are significantly different in other religious traditions,19 but
American law only rarely acknowledges this diversity.2"
The Christian religious roots of American family law reach far
beyond the impediments to marriage. The traditional restrictions on
divorce, based on Roman Catholic and Anglican teachings, contrast
with the acceptance of divorce in Jewish and Islamic law." The bar on
polygamy contradicts the current practice in many Islamic and African
cultures, 2 2 and historical practice among Jews, Hindus, and Native
Americans. 23 Age and consent requirements for marriage are in tension with some types of arranged marriage, which remain common in
various Asian, Islamic, andJewish communities, 24 and with those traditions that grant a father or guardian the authority to consent to a

25
marriage of his minor children.
The close identification between our civil concept of marriage
and the Christian religious tradition also operates at a deeper level.

Nancy Cott describes the political importance of marriage norms dat-

17. Id. at 83-85; see also GROSSBERG, supra note 9, at 110-13.
18. Id. at 85-87; see, e.g., In re May's Estate, 114 N.E.2d 4, 7 (N.Y. 1953) (concluding that
an uncle-niece marriage "was not within the prohibitions of natural law"). Even within the
Christian traditions, there are significant differences in religious doctrine concerning marriage. See WiTTE, supra note 7; see POULTER, supra note 15, at 8-10.
19. For a general discussion of marriage impediments in different traditions, see Ze'ev
W. Falk, Jewish Family Law, in 4 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAw ch. 11,
28, 39-40 (Mary Ann Glendon ed., 1983) (Jewish tradition); Sir Norman Anderson, Islamic
Family Law, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAw, supra, at 55, 59-60 (Is-

lamic tradition); J. Duncan M. Derrett & T.K. Krishnamurthy Iyer, Hindu Family Law, in
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW, supra, at 80, 81-82 (Hindu tradition).

20. See, e.g., In re May's Estate, 119 N.E. 2d at 7. This case involved a Jewish marriage
between uncle and niece expressly permitted by the Rhode Island statute cited infra at note
145.
21. Falk, supra note 19, at 46-50 (Jewish law); Anderson, supra note 19, at 69-73 (Islamic
law).
22. See Anderson, supra note 19, at 57, 63-65.

23. See Falk, supra note 19, at 31-32, 35-36 (describing the Jewish law); Derrett & Iyer,
supra note 19, at 81-82 (noting that India permitted polygamy until the Hindu Marriage
Act of 1955).
24. Falk, supra note 19, at 36 (Jewish tradition); Derrett and Iyer, supra note 19, at 81
(Hindu tradition).
25. This was permitted in Jewish communities in ancient times but the power was gradually limited under rabbinic law. Falk, supra note 19, at 33, 42. The practice has been
narrowed by legislation in Islamic countries over the past century. See Anderson, supra
note 19, at 62-63. In India, child marriages have been officially prohibited since 1929. See
Derrett and Iyer, supra note 19, at 83 & n.623.
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ing back to the founding of the United States. 26 For the founders,
family governance based on marriage was a model and metaphor for
the notion of government by consent. 27 Moreover, the institution of
marriage made white, male citizens the political and legal representatives of their households. 28 The equation of Christian monogamy
with civilization, moderation, and liberty gave political meaning and
urgency to these marriage norms, which were preserved and enforced
through various government policies over several centuries.2 9 She
writes, "A commitment to monogamous marriage on a Christian
model lodged deep in American political theory, as vivid as belief in
popular sovereignty or in voluntary consent of the governed or in the
necessity of a government of laws. ' °
As Cott explains, national policies treated this model of marriage
as essential to the process of civilizing and Americanizing peoples with
different customs.3" Practices including polygamy among Native
Americans, informal cohabitation and separation among former
slaves, and arranged marriage among Asian immigrants generated suspicion and hostility.3 2 Government responses were often coercive, either excluding members of these groups from the civil polity or
forcing them to adopt new norms of marital behavior as the cost of
full membership.3"
Against this background, the intense conflict over Mormon polygamy in the years after the Civil War appears as part of a larger story
about American identity, politics, civilization, and race. Cott's work
helps explain why, despite the constitutional commitment to free exercise of religion, courts in the United States refused to protect marital practices that fell outside these Christian norms.3" When the issue
reached the Supreme Court in Reynolds v. United States,3 5 the Court
wrote that "[p]olygamy has always been odious among the northern
26. See NANCY F. Cor-r, PUBLIC Vows: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 9-13

(2000).
27. Id. at 10.
28. Id. at 11.
29. See id. at 21-23 (noting roots of these ideas in Montesquieu's political theory).
30. Id. at 23.
31. Id. at 24-27.
32. See id. at 25-28 (noting disapproval of Native American family practices); id. at 77104 (discussing efforts to remake families of former slaves after the Civil War); id. at 139,
149-54 (examining immigration policies concerning polygamy and arranged marriages).
33. Id. at 139, 152-54. Marriage to a white person was considered to contribute towards
the civilization of a Native American, see id. at 27, but generally the pressure to assimilate
did not extend to permitting intermarriage with whites. Id. at 26-27, 99-103, 184-85.
34. See id. at 105-31.
35. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).

546
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and western nations of Europe, and, until the establishment of the
Mormon Church, was almost exclusively a feature of the life of Asiatic
and of African people. ' 6 After describing the history of laws against
bigamy in the English ecclesiastical and civil law tradition, the Court
concluded "it is impossible to believe that the constitutional guaranty
of religious freedom was intended to prohibit legislation in respect to
this most important feature of social life.' ' 37 As in the contemporaneous English case of Hyde v. Hyde, the Supreme Court defined civil marriage as Christian marriage and found that polygamy contradicted its
very essence. 38
Since Reynolds, the Supreme Court has recognized rights in marriage and family life that trigger significant constitutional protection.3 9 Several of these decisions recognize a link between free
exercise rights and family privacy, suggesting some level of constitutional protection for religious family law traditions.4" The Court has
never overruled Reynolds, and although it rejected the rationale for
the decision in Wisconsin v. Yoder, constitutional protection for relig-

36. Id. at 164.
37. Id. at 164-65. The Court sustained the defendant's bigamy conviction, concluding
that while his religious beliefs were constitutionally protected, his religious practices were
not. Id at 166. The Court asked rhetorically whether the government should be required
to allow human sacrifice as a part of religious worship, or if it should defer to a wife's
religious belief that "it [is] her duty to burn herself up on the funeral pile of her dead
husband." Id. In the years after Reynolds, the court continued to condemn polygamy, most
recendy in Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946) (sustaining conviction of Mormon
polygamist for "immoral" conduct under the Mann Act).
38. Hyde v. Hyde, I L.R.-P. & D. 130, 135-37 (H.L. 1866) (refusing to recognize potentially polygamous Mormon marriage for purpose of granting a divorce). The court stated
that "marriage, as understood in Christendom, may for this purpose be defined as the
voluntary union for life of one man and one woman, to the exclusion of all others." Id. at
133.
39. For cases concerning marriage and divorce, see, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (Constitution protects a right to marital privacy); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (antimiscegenation laws violate the Constitution); Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380-83 (1971) (Constitution requires access to courts to obtain
a divorce despite inability to pay). For cases concerning constitutionally protected parental rights, see, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923) (recognizing a right to
teach children a foreign language); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972) (finding
that an unwed father has a right to a hearing on fitness before the state removes child from
his custody); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (requiring proof by clear and convincing evidence for termination of parental rights); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57
(2000) (finding third party visitation statute infringed parent's rights).
40. See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 518-19 (1925) (recognizing parents'
rights to have their children educated in Catholic schools); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205 (1972) (allowing a religious exception to compulsory school attendance law for oldorder Amish children after eighth grade).
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ious polygamy still seems unlikely.4 1 Under the Court's more recent
First Amendment decisions, a plaintiff seeking to establish a free exercise claim must establish that the disputed law is targeted at a specific
religious practice and thus not neutral or generally applicable. 4 2 Ironically, despite their ecclesiastical origins, our marriage and divorce
laws are understood today to be "neutral and generally applicable."4 3

With the notable exception of polygamy, accommodation of religious and cultural traditions in family settings is relatively easy when
it is clear that individual family members have chosen to participate in
a particular institution or practice. Often, there will be no occasion
for the law to intervene. Disputes that implicate religious disagreements within a family pose a different problem. Family courts encounter this problem in some custody cases, when one parent's claim
41. While the majority opinion in Yoder cites Reynolds for the proposition that activities
of individuals, even when religiously based, are often subject to regulation by the states,
Justice Douglas observes that the decision "even promises that in time Reynolds will be overruled." Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220, 247 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part). Following Yoder, however, an appellate court rejected the free exercise claim of a Mormon polygamist in Potterv.
Murray City, 760 F.2d 1065 (10th Cir. 1985), writing, "Monogamy is inextricably woven into
the fabric of our society. It is the bedrock upon which our culture is built ....
In light of
these fundamental values, the State is justified, by a compelling interest, in upholding and
enforcing its ban on plural marriage to protect the monogamous marriage relationship."
Id. at 1070 (citations omitted).
See also Keith E. Sealing, Polygamists out of the Closet: Statutoiy and State Constitutional
ProhibitionsAgainst Polygamy are UnconstitutionalUnder the Free Exercise Clause, 17 GA. ST. L.
REv. 691, 747-52 (2001); Todd M. Gillett, Note, The Absolution of Reynolds: The Constitutionality of Religious Polygamy, 8 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 497, 526-28 (2000). These writers describe these as "hybrid" claims based both on free exercise grounds and the
constitutionally-protected interest in marriage and family life. There is also an argument
that laws prohibiting polygamy are not "neutral, generally applicable laws," but rather
targeted at a specific religious practice.
42. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533-34
(1993).
Beginning with its 1963 decision in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 389 (1963), the Court applied a balancing test that considered whether a law substantially burdened a particular
religious practice, and whether a compelling government interest justified the burden. Id.
at 403-11. The Court repudiated Sherbert in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990), restoring the distinction made in Reynolds between religious belief, which is protected, and religious practice, which is not. Id. at 882-85. Although Congress made an
attempt to restore the Sherbert test in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2000), the Court found the Act unconstitutional in City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 531-35 (1997).
43. See also Universal Life Church v. Utah, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1313-14 (D. Utah
2002) (holding that a statute which denies authority to solemnize marriages to clergy ordained through mail or by Internet does not violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment); Bierer v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 563 (1994) (holding that federal law defining
eligibility for spousal benefits based on state laws, where state statute required marriage
license in addition to religious ceremony, was neutral and valid under the First
Amendment).
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for free exercise and accommodation of religious practices is met by
4
the other parent's argument against the establishment of religion.
Courts cannot decide these cases on religious grounds, and must
therefore either find a neutral basis for a ruling or refuse to
intervene.4 5
There are analogues of this problem in court cases concerning
internal church disputes. The Supreme Court has concluded that
civil courts may resolve such disputes using "neutral principles" of
contract, property, or trust laws, but may not make decisions on the
basis of religious doctrine and practice. 4 6 Therefore, courts faced
with a family-religious disagreement would be required to rely on neutral principles. To the extent that family members have used the tools
of contract, property, and trust law in marriage and divorce disputes,
courts may attempt to resolve those issues as private law matters.
B.

Pluralist Traditions

While regulation of marriage and the family in Europe and North
America is the province of secular law, religious and customary family
law retains its authority in many other parts of the world. European
colonial powers typically extended their laws to the business and commercial activities of their colonies, but left matters of personal status,
including marriage, divorce, and inheritance to be regulated by local
norms. 47 In colonies with culturally and religiously diverse populations, the result was a pluralist family law, composed of separate laws
44. See, e.g., Kendall v. Kendall, 687 N.E.2d 1228, 1235-36 (Mass. 1997) (considering
dispute between fundamentalist Christian father and Orthodox Jewish mother); Sagar v.
Sagar, 781 N.E.2d 54, 60-61 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003) (considering dispute between Hindu
parents over performance of ritual known as Chudakarana).
45. See, e.g., Kendall, 687 N.E.2d at 1233-35 (affirming a judgment limiting the father's
right to share his religious beliefs based upon evidence that the religious conflict was causing substantial harm to the children, who had a strong and different religious self-identity).
In Sagar, 781 N.E.2d at 56-60, the court approved an order that the ritual should not be
performed until the parents reached agreement or the child was old enough to make her
own determination.
46. R.W. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603-04 (1979). See generally Kent Greenawalt,
Hands Off! Civil Court Involvement in Conflicts Over Religious Property, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1843,
1844-45 (1998). Greenawalt suggests that the argument for non-involvement in these cases
draws force from the Court's determination in Smith that "courts should not have to assess
religious understandings and the strength of religious feeling in order to decide if the
religious claim is strong enough to warrant an exemption." Id. at 1906. As he points out,
this inquiry is even more difficult when a court is asked to decide "which of the competing
assertions from within the group is right or more true to a tradition." Id.
47. See RENR DAVID &JOHN E.C. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY
474-79, 495, 555-59 (3d ed. 1985) (giving examples of the many variations of legal sources
in religiously diverse populations); M.B. HOOKER, LEGAL PLURALISM: AN INTRODUcTiON TO
COLONIAL AND NEO-COLONIAL LAws (1975).
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and systems of regulation for different religious or ethnic groups. 4 8
Many of these systems still exist today.49
In Israel, for example, in a practice dating back to the Ottoman
Empire and the British mandate, religious courts applying religious
law exercise jurisdiction over marital status within the Jewish, Muslim,
and Christian communities.5 ° Kenya, like other African nations colonized by the British, maintains a system of customary law as well as
separate statutes regulating Christian, Muslim, and Hindu marriages
and divorces. 51 Colonial authorities intervened in some aspects of local family law by prohibiting traditional Hindu practices in India, such
as dowries and child marriage, 52 and by extending to Hindu and Muslim women limited rights to divorce. 53 The "official" religious and
customary law applied by colonial courts differed notably from the
traditional law that preceded it and often continued to operate
outside the formal legal system. 54
Within a single legal and religious tradition, there may be substantial variations in religious or customary family law. In Islamic law,
48. SeeAYELET SHACHAR, MULTICULTURALJURISDICTIONS 78-80 (2001). This type of pluralism goes back to at least the thirteenth century in South Asia, after Muslim law was
established in South India. See DAVID PEARL & WERNER MENSKI, MUSLIM FAMILY LAw 30-31
(3d ed. 1998). For a discussion of the interaction of English law and Muslim law in South
Asia, see id. at 34-44.
49. SHACHAR, supra note 48, at 79-80.
50. Id. at 80; Frances Raday, Israel-The Incorporation of Religious Patriarchy in a Modern
State, 4 INT'L REV. COMP. PUB. POLY 209, 210 (1992). Israel recognizes fifteen different
religious communities with distinct jurisdiction over personal law questions. Michael
Corinaldi, Protecting Minority Cultures and Religions in Matters of Personal Status both within
State Boundaries and beyond State Frontiers-theIsraeli System, in FAMILIES ACROSS FRONTIERS
385, 386 (Nigel Lowe & Gillian Douglas eds., 1996).
51. SHACHAR, supra note 48, at 79-80; Janet Kabeberi-Macharia, Family Law and Gender
in Kenya, 4 INT'L REV. COMP. PUB. POL'Y 193, 194-95 (1992).
52. Derrett & Iyer, supra note 19, at 83 & nn.623, 627 (citing the Child Marriage Restraint Act of 1929 and the Dowry Prohibition Act of 1961); see also H. PATRICK GLENN,
LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD 259-60 (2000) (noting that much of Hindu law, particularly with regard to polygamy and child marriage, is obsolete).
53. Derrett & Iyer, supra note 19, at 81-82, 85 (citing Hindu Marriage Act of 1955,
which prohibited polygamy and made divorce more widely available); PEARL & MENSKI,
supra note 48, at 301-04; see also Nadya Haider, Islamic Legal Reform: The Case of Pakistan and
Family Law, 12 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 287, 297-98 (2000) (discussing the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act in Pakistan).
54. See PEARL & MENSKI, supra note 48 (addressing these issues with respect to English
law and Muslim law in South Asia). For a discussion of colonial and traditional family law
in southern Africa, see Lisa Fishbayn, Litigating the Right to Culture: Family Law in the New
South Africa, 13 INT'LJ.L. POL'Y & FAM. 147, 153 (1999), and Puleng Letuka & Alice Armstrong, "Which Law? Which Family? Which Women?" Problems of Enforcing CEDAW in Southern
Africa, in FAMILIES ACROSS FRONTIERS, supra note 50, at 207, 207-08. See also DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 47, at 495, 560-63 (describing tensions between traditional law and colonial
legal systems).
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these variations trace to different schools of Islamic jurisprudence,5 5
and to different codifications of the tradition in different jurisdictions.56 Hindu family law in India is not the same as the Hindu law
applied in parts of Africa. 57 African customary law may have many
different variations within a single nation, corresponding with different tribal and cultural groups. 58
While multiculturalism has drawn significant scholarly attention
and debate in the past decade, legal pluralism of this sort has not
taken root in the west.6 ° There are traces of legal pluralism in the
United States, where Native Americans retain powers of self-government that extend to family law.61 In Australia and New Zealand, Aboriginal and Maori customary law receive some recognition, but
courts do not apply or enforce this customary law directly.6 2 Religious
clergy have legal authority to formalize marriages in common law
countries, provided that the parties obtain a marriage license from the
state.6 3 With these small exceptions, western industrialized countries
55. PEARL & MENSKI, supra note 48, at 16-17; Azizah Y. al-Hibri, MarriageLaws in Muslim
Countries: A Comparative Study of Certain Egyptian, Syrian, Moroccan and Tunisian Marriage
Laws, 4 INT'L REv. COMP. PUB. POL'Y 227, 229-30 (1992) (listing Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i,
Hanbali, and Ja'fari as the five major schools of Islamic legal interpretation).
56. See al-Hibri, supra note 55, at 229-30 (Islamic family law codes in Egypt, Syria, Morocco, and Tunisia); Haider, supra note 53, at 298-315 (examining historical tensions between traditionalist and modernist approaches to Pakistani Islamic law); Sebastian Poulter,
The Claim to a Separate Islamic System of Personal Law for British Muslims, in IsLAMIc FAMILY
LAw 147, 158 (Chibli Mallat & Jane Connors eds., 1990) (noting that one problem with
implementing Islamic family law in England is choosing which tradition of Muslim law to
follow).
57. Derrett & Iyer, supra note 19, at 80-81.
58. See Kabeberi-Macharia, supra note 51, at 193-94 (noting that customary law within
Kenya reflected the individual values and customs of different indigenous communities).
59. See generally Ayelet Shachar, Two Critiques of Multiculturalism, 23 CARDozo L. REv.
253, 253-54 (2001) (critiquing current multiculturalism literature).
60. E.g., Poulter, supra note 56, at 157-64 (discussing the unsuccessful campaign in
Britain for a separate system of Islamic family law). However, until the nineteenth century
in Europe, European Jewish communities were self-regulating and rabbinic courts had authority over marriage and divorce. David Novak, Jewish Marriage and Civil Law: A Two-Way
Street?, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1059, 1068-69 (2000).
61. Barbara Ann Atwood, TribalJurisprudenceand CulturalMeanings of the Family, 79 NEB.
L. REv. 577, 593-95 (2000).
62. The Law Reform Commission (Australia), I Report No. 31: The Recognition of
Aboriginal Customary Laws § 6,
69-70 (1986), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/
au/other/IndigLRes/ 1986/1 /index.html; see Patrick Parkinson, Taking MulticulturalismSeriously: MarriageLaw and the Rights of Minorities, 16 SYDNEY L. REv. 473, 480 (1994) (noting
that Australia does not recognize Aboriginal customary marriages as legal marriages); see
also Bill Atkin & Graeme Austin, Cross-culturalChallenges to Family Law in Aotearoa/New Zealand, in FAMILIES ACROss FRONTIERS, supra note 50, at 327, 333-34 (describing the limited
role of Maori customary law in New Zealand family law).
63. See infra notes 112-114 and accompanying text.
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maintain unified legal systems, and persons of all religious, cultural,
and ethnic backgrounds are subject to the same family law rules and
institutions.6 4

Ayelet Shachar characterizes the governance model in which different religious communities are vested with legal power over their
members' personal status as a "religious particularist" paradigm, and
contrasts it with systems in which the state retains authority over family
law matters and all citizens are subject to a uniform secular family
law. 65 In evaluating these models, Shachar notes the powerful role of
family law in transmitting culture and determining group membership through personal status and lineage rules.6 6 Family law traditions
"do not simply define membership boundaries: they also regulate the
distribution of rights, duties, and ultimately power between men and
women within the community."6 7 She also observes that women's
unique role in perpetuation of the group often results in their being
subject to heightened control, constrained by rules that entrench
their dependence and inequality within the community." Thus, a
pluralist system "maintains the autonomy and sovereignty of different
minority cultures," but it may put at risk the equality rights of vulnera64. In the United States today, provision for an explicidy religious family law regime
would violate the bar on established religion under the First Amendment. But see Carol
Weisbrod, Family, Church and State: An Essay on Constitutionalismand Religious Authority, 26J.
FAM. L. 741, 752 (1988) (noting that formal separation of church and state was not required at the state level until the twentieth century).
65. SHACHAR, supra note 48, at 78-79. Shachar distinguishes the "secular absolutist"
model of civil law countries such as France, Germany, and the Netherlands, in which there
is strict separation of church and state, and the modified absolutist system employed in
Australia, Britain, Canada, and the United States, which permits some formal recognition
of religious traditions, such as by authorizing religious officials to solemnize marriages. Id.
at 72-78.
66. She describes this as a demarcating or gatekeeping function. Id. at 49-54.
67. Id at 57.
68. Id. at 54-55. Shachar describes a variety of ways in which women are regulated by
the group, including these:
Since women reproduce future members of the collective, their reproductive activities are often the first to be closely monitored by their identity groups. Women are generally controlled in terms of the situations in which they are allowed
to marry and have children. In other words, they must procreate in ways that will
preserve the membership boundaries and autonomous identity of their group.
Second, the conditions under which marriage and childbearing are considered
legitimate are of special importance. Third, women's function as cultural conduits for the group's unique history and identity imposes a duty to faithfully transmit the group's social norms, customs and traditions, collective memories, and
specific expectations to the next generation.
Id. at 56; see alsoJudith Romney Wegner, The Status of Women in Jewish and Islamic Marriage
andDivorce Law, 5 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 1 (1982) (tracing "women's progress from a status
of near-chattel to one of near-person").
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ble group members.6 9 Conversely, while the uniform systems do a better job protecting citizenship rights and ensuring equal treatment,
they deny the importance of particular cultural or religious norms
and may discriminate against minority groups whose traditions are distinct from those embedded within the dominant culture.7 °
International human rights laws address both the rights of vulnerable group members and protections for cultural minority groups.
Women's equality within the family was addressed in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which declares that "[m] en and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or
religion, have the right to marry and found a family. They are entitled
to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution. '"7' This principle was reiterated and made binding in 1966 with
72
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR). 7 The Universal Declaration also provides that
"[m]arriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent
of the intending spouses, ' 74 a principle elaborated in the 1962 United
Nations Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage, and Registration of Marriages. 7 5
The interface between family law and gender equality was addressed more fully in the Convention on the Elimination of all forms
of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), 76 which provides that
"States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and
69. SHACHAR, supra note 48, at 81.
70. Id. at 75-78.
71. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 16(1), G.A. Res. 217 A(III), U.N. GAOR,
3d Sess. U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR]; see Estin, supra note 4, at 287-89
(describing international human rights protections for marriage and the family).
72. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 23, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, 179 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]. The ICCPR has
been ratified by 151 countries including the U.S. See Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights, Status of Ratifications of the PrincipalInternationalHuman
Rights Treaties 12 (Nov. 2, 2003), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf.
73. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
art. 10, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 7 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR].
74. UDHR, supra note 71, art. 16(2).
75. United Nations Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage
and Registration of Marriages, Dec. 10, 1962, art. 1(1), 521 U.N.T.S. 231, 234 (entered into
force Dec. 9, 1964) [hereinafter Convention on Consent to Marriage]. The Convention
was directed at abolishing certain religious and customary law practices, such as marriages
of children and forced marriages. See generally Egon Schwelb, Marriage and Human Rights,
12 Am.J. Comp. L. 337, 337-38 (1963).
76. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,
adopted Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW].
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family relations."7 7 CEDAW's mandate of gender equality in matters
of marriage and family relations was met with strong objections from a
number of nations because of its incompatibility with provisions of
Islamic law. 78 Some countries have made similar objections to provisions of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). 79 The
CRC, which has been almost universally ratified, ° requires that "the
best interests of the child... be a primary consideration" in all actions
concerning children. 8 ' This standard was understood to be flexible
and indeterminate enough to accommodate a wide range of cultural

77. Id. art. 16(1), 1249 U.N.T.S. at 20. Article 16(1) continues:
[I]n particular, [States Parties] shall ensure, on a basis of equality of men and
women:
(a) The same right to enter into marriage;
(b) The same right freely to choose a spouse and to enter into marriage only with
their free and full consent;
(c) The same rights and responsibilities during marriage and at its dissolution;
(d) The same rights and responsibilities as parents, irrespective of their marital
status, in matters relating to their children; in all cases the interests of the children shall be paramount;
(e) The same rights to decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing
of their children and to have access to the information, education and means to
enable them to exercise these rights;
(f) The same rights and responsibilities with regard to guardianship, wardship,
trusteeship and adoption of children, or similar institutions where these concepts
exist in national legislation; in all cases the interests of the children shall be
paramount;
(g) The same personal rights as husband and wife, including the right to choose
a family name, a profession and an occupation;
(h) The same rights for both spouses in respect of the ownership, acquisition,
management, administration, enjoyment and disposition of property, whether
free of charge or for a valuable consideration.
Id. In addition, Article 5 provides that:
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures: (a) To modify the social and
cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the
elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based
on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women[.]
Id. art. 5, 1249 U.N.T.S. at 17.
78. Michele Brandt &Jeffrey A. Kaplan, The Tension Between Women's Rights and Religious
Rights: Reservations to CEDAW by Egypt, Bangladesh and Tunisia, 12 J.L. & RELIGION 105, 107
(1995-96).
79. Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 43
[hereinafter CRC].
80. Rebeca Rios-Kohn, The Convention on the Rights of the Child: Progress and Challenges, 5
GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 139, 139 (1998); see also Susan Kilbourne, Placingthe Convention on the Rights of the Child in an American Context, 26 HuM. RTS. 27 (1999) (discussing the
failure of the United States to ratify the CRC).
81. CRC, supra note 79, art. 3(1), 1577 U.N.T.S. at 46.
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variation.8 2 Despite this consensus, there is continuing disagreement
over the suggestion that traditional practices may in some instances
need to give way in order to protect children's welfare."3
These international covenants also endorse the ideal of cultural
and religious pluralism. Various conventions prohibit discrimination
on grounds such as "race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status,"" and others protect the "freedom of thought, conscience and
religion." 5 The agreements extend explicit recognition to ethnic, religious, and linguistic minority groups, with provisions that protect the
right of individuals, "in community with the other members of their
group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own
religion, or to use their own language." 6 According to the ICCPR,
"[f]reedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to
such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect
public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and
freedoms of others.

87

Human rights principles can offer some guidance to courts in the
United States, 8 but the treaty provisions are not directly enforceable
82. The drafters used the indefinite article-"a" primary consideration rather than
"the" primary consideration-to provide additional flexibility. Philip Alston, The Best Interests Principle: Towards a Reconciliation of Culture and Human Rights, 8 INT'L J.L. & FAM. 1, 1213 (1994). Alston notes that despite the commonality of the "best interests" standard, the
principle is given "very diverse interpretations" in different settings. Id. at 5. During the
drafting of the CRC, several Islamic countries were able to secure modifications of some
objectionable provisions of the CRC. Alison Dundes Renteln, Cultural Bias in International
Law, 92 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 232, 239 (1998).
83. The CRC requires states to "take all effective and appropriate measures with a view
to abolishing traditional practices prejudicial to the health of children." CRC, supra note
79, art. 24(3), 1577 U.N.T.S. at 52; see David Pearl, A Note on Children'sRights in Islamic Law,
in CHILDREN'S RIGHTS AND TRADITIONAL VALUES 86, 86-87 (Gillian Douglas & Leslie Sebba
eds., 1998) (discussing reservations made by several Islamic countries to the CRC); Alison
Dundes Renteln, Who's Afraid of the CRC: Objections to the Convention on the Rights of the Child,
3 ILSAJ. INT'L & Comp. L. 629, 633-36 (1997) (describing objections to the CRC in the
United States).
84. UDHR, supra note 71, art. 2; ICESCR, supra note 73, art. 2(2), 993 U.N.T.S. at 5;
ICCPR, supra note 72, art. 2(1), 999 U.N.T.S. at 173.
85. UDHR, supra note 71, art. 18; ICCPR, supra note 72, art. 18, 999 U.N.T.S. at 178.
The CRC contains similar provisions. See CRC, supra note 79, art. 14(1) (freedom of
thought and religion) and art. 30 (right to enjoy culture and practice religion), 1577
U.N.T.S. at 49; see also Declarationon the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief G.A. Res. 55, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc.
A/36/684, art. 1(1) (1981).
86. ICCPR, supra note 72, art. 27, 999 U.N.T.S. at 179; CRC, supra note 79, art. 30
(covering ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities and "persons of indigenous origin").
87. ICCPR, supra note 72, art. 18(3), 999 U.N.T.S. at 178.
88. The United States has signed these agreements and it has ratified the ICCPR. 138
CONG. REC. S4781, S4783 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992). See generally S. EXEC. REP. No. 102-23
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in federal or state courts. s 9 Their terms suggest important and often
persuasive policy considerations for courts encountering diverse family traditions,9" and may be treated as customary international law.9 1
These agreements have certainly not obviated the difficult conflicts in
values between legal traditions, but they reflect a level of international
consensus that is particularly relevant to resolving cultural conflicts in
domestic law.
C. MulticulturalFamily Law
Since 1965, immigration to the United States has increased and
shifted, bringing many more individuals and families from Asia, Africa, and South America.9 2 With this immigration, the pluralist challenges that were once characteristic of family law in colonial legal
systems have diffused beyond the former colonies and into the nations
of the west. Immigrants, indigenous peoples, and those whose culture
or religion placed them within a minority group now seek more
openly to preserve aspects of their family traditions or to use those
(1992) reprinted at 31 I.L.M. 645 (1992) (detailing the Foreign Relations Committee's
views on ratification of the ICCPR and setting forth reservations, understandings, and declarations to the convention).
The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations held hearings on CEDAW in 1988 and
1990 and again in 1994. S. EXEC. REP. No. 103-38, at 2-3 (1994). Eventually, the Committee proposed ratification of CEDAW with a series of reservations, understandings, and declarations. Id. at 3.
89. The ICCPR is subject to a declaration that the covenant is not self-executing, and
an understanding that it will be implemented by the federal government to the extent that
it exercises legislative and judicial jurisdiction over matters covered in the treaty. S. EXEC.
REP. No. 102-23, at 19. Family law matters are heard primarily in state courts, and the
federalism issues present a controversial problem. Compare Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification
of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 341, 345-36
(1995) (arguing that, as treaties, international agreements preempt state law within the
U.S., even in areas of traditional state control, such as family law), with Curtis A. Bradley,
The Treaty Power andAmerican Federalism,97 MIcH. L. REV. 390, 393-94 (1998) (arguing that
the treaty power should be subject to federalism limitations).
90. A number of recent decisions have considered provisions of the CRC. See Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 233-34 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (class action challenging child
welfare system); Beharry v. Reno, 183 F. Supp. 2d 584, 596-603 (E.D.N.Y. 2002), reversed on
other grounds, Beharry v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2003) (waiver of deportation);
Sadeghi v. I.N.S., 40 F.3d 1139, 1146-47 (10th Cir. 1994) (Kane, J., dissenting) (asylum
claim); Batista v. Batista, No. FA 92 0059661, 1992 WL 156171, at *6-7 (Conn. Super. Ct.
June 18, 1992) (international custody dispute).
91. E.g., Beharry, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 604.
92. This was the result of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, which eliminated national origin quotas. Bill Ong Hing, Beyond the Rhetoric of Assimilation and Cultural
Pluralism:Addressing the Tension of Separatism and Conflict in an Immigration-DrivenMultiracial
Society, 81 CAL. L. REv. 863, 865-66, 918-19 (1993). As Hing describes, assimilation pressures have continued. See id. at 869-75.
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traditions to maintain their identity.13 As we recognize a right to culture and religion, we are forced to acknowledge the multiplicity of
identities, loyalties, and commitments of Americans today.94 For the
dominant society, the challenge of pluralism lies in making space for
legal principles, social relationships, and group affiliations that have
often been ignored.
A pluralism that permits members of cultural or ethnic groups to
maintain distinct communities with significant social and political autonomy is controversial in the American context, because of the perceived costs to the coherence of the larger union and to the meaning
of individual citizenship.9 5 For this reason, the development of separate legal systems regulating distinct minority communities is not a
broadly viable alternative. 6 In the context of private family law disputes, however, the primary purpose of cultural and religious pluralism is to allow individuals to express and maintain their identity and
beliefs in the setting of their family relationships.9 7
In our contemporary understanding, family law is a centrally important arena for these expressive purposes. 98 Many commentators
have described aspects of the transformation of the family during the
latter part of the twentieth century, and the corresponding shifts in
the law. Family law has been privatized; 99 it has shifted toward a focus
on the individual rather than the family as an entity; t0 0 it draws in93. See

SHACHAR,

supra note 48, at 33-36; see also PEARL

AND MENSKI,

supra note 48, at 52-

61.
94. Shachar, supra note 59, at 255-56.
95. See id. at 259-60 (describing the "external critique of multiculturalism"). This is not
a purely American problem. See Elaine Sciolino, A Maze of Identitiesfor the Muslims of France,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2003, at A3 (describing the rapidly increasing Arab population in
France and the resulting breakdown of a uniform "French" identity).
96. See, e.g., Poulter, supra note 56, at 158-59 (describing failed efforts by Islamic community in England to establish separate family law system, due partly to the lack of societal
cohesion such system would engender). However, legal autonomy has been recognized in
the context of indigenous or Native American tribes. Atwood, supra note 61, at 593-95.
These groups continue to exercise powers of self-government and are understood to retain
important aspects of their sovereignty. See id. (noting sovereignty exercised by tribal courts
over areas such as family law).
97. See Poulter, supra note 56, at 147 (explaining that moral, religious, and legal norms
of a particular society "are often regarded as embodying the quintessential culture of a
distinctive group of people").
98. Cf Carol Weisbrod, On the Expressive Functions of Family Law, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REv.
991, 997 (1989) (considering role of law as a source of symbols and values).
99. See generallyJanaB. Singer, The Privatizationof Family Law, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 1443,
1444 (describing the privatization of family law).
100. E.g.,JANET L. DOLGIN, DEFINING THE FAMILY: LAw, TECHNOLOGY, AND REPRODUCTION
IN AN UNEASY AGE 39-57 (1997) (describing a shift from family autonomy to autonomous
individuality).

2004]

PLURALISM IN AMERICAN FAMILY LAW

557

creasingly on contractual rather than moral discourse; 10 ' it is less hierarchical and more concerned with gender and race equality.' 0 2 These
changes permit a wider range of personal choice, and the flourishing
of a greater diversity of values and private understandings.'0 3
At the same time, despite the move toward greater private ordering of family life, courts and legislatures continue to enforce a set of
background norms based on constitutional values. Family law rules
cannot perpetuate discrimination based on race, 1

4

gender, 1 0 5 or le-

birth. 0 6

gitimacy of
The rights of parents-even unmarried parents-receive both procedural and substantive protection from the
due process clause.'0 7 These principles emerged as constraints on
101. Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformationof American Law, 83 MICH.
L. RFv. 1803 (1985); Marjorie Maguire Shultz, ContractualOrderingof Marriage: A New Model
for State Policy, 70 CAL. L. REv. 204, 208-09 (1982).
102. See infra notes 104-105 and accompanying text (discussing the intersection of family
law rules and racial and sexual discrimination).
103. Despite these dramatic transitions, marriage law in the United States adheres to
two aspects of its traditional religious code. One is the prohibition of polygamy, discussed
supra at notes 35-41 and infra at notes 151-155 and accompanying text. The other, recently
highly contested, is the refusal to permit marriages of same-sex couples. See generally CoTT,
supra note 26, at 215-21. In both these contexts, arguments may be made from principles of
gender equality. See infra note 105 (discussing intersection of family law principles and
gender equality).
104. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (invalidating state law prohibiting interracial marriages); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 430-31, 434 (1984) (reversing a state's
decision to remove a child from her mother's custody because the mother had married a
man of a different race); Multiethnic Placement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 1996b (2000)
(enacting prohibition on delay or denial of adoptive placement based on a child's race).
105. See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 271 (1979) (holding unconstitutional an Alabama
statute that required only men to pay alimony); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 394
(1979) (holding unconstitutional a New York statute that allowed unwed mothers, but not
unwed fathers, to block the adoption of children by the other parent). Ironically, both Orr
and Caban rejected legal rules that discriminated against men. The process of eliminating
the legal disabilities of married women has taken several centuries. See generally CLARK,
supra note 7, at 286-305 (summarizing the development of the legal rights of married women). One court has taken the position that rules barring same-sex marriage constitute
gender discrimination. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993) (holding that sex is a
suspect classification and that statute barring same-sex marriages was presumptively unconstitutional as discrimination based on sex).
106. See, e.g., Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 70, 72 (1968) (holding unconstitutional a
Louisiana law barring illegitimate children from recovering for the wrongful death of their
mother); Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 463-65 (1988) (holding unconstitutional a Pennsylvania statutory scheme requiring an illegitimate child to prove paternity within six years
of birth in order to receive paternal financial support).
107. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65-67 (2000) (holding unconstitutional a
Washington statute that allowed any person to petition for visitation rights with a child,
because statute interfered with a liberty interest of the natural parents protected by substantive due process); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747, 769 (1982) (holding that New
York statute violated procedural due process, by permitting termination of parental rights
on less than clear and convincing evidence); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657-58 (1972)
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courts and legislatures, but they are equally important in a world in
which the role of the state is to facilitate and monitor bargaining and
dispute resolution within the family.' °8
Beyond this constitutional framework, there are norms that effectuate what Carl Schneider has called the "protective function" of family law.' 9 Statutes define property rights and child support
obligations, particularly in the event of death or divorce. Other statutes provide basic protections against physical and emotional abuse.
Contracts within the family are subject to substantive limits and
heightened scrutiny for procedural fairness. 1 0 Alternative dispute
resolution is encouraged, but courts maintain final authority to decide
matters of child custody, visitation, and child support."' Custody and
child support decisions must further the child's best interests.
Within the outside boundaries defined by these norms, there is
substantial room for the expression of diverse religious and cultural
traditions. Individuals and families should be accorded the freedom
to shape and express their own values and beliefs within these broadly
defined parameters, making use of familiar legal tools and principles.
To the extent that the legal framework constrains the expression of
different values and traditions, these limits should be carefully considered, and understood as defining a common set of legal and social
entitlements that establish in concrete terms the meaning of membership in the larger society.
II.

ENCOUNTERING DVERSiTY

Confronted with the marriage rituals of Islamic and Hindu tradition, the religious divorce proceedings of Jews, or the complexities of
international custody disputes, judges deciding family law disputes
face a three-part challenge. First, the court has an obligation to appreciate and attempt to understand the place and importance of unfamiliar cultural and religious practices caught up in the dispute. At the
same time, the court must reevaluate familiar legal principles in order
(holding that unwed fathers are constitutionally entitled to a hearing on their parental
fitness before the state can remove children from their custody).

108.: Carl E. Schneider, The ChannelingFunction in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REv. 495,
497 (1992).
109. Id. Schneider writes, "One of law's most basic duties is to protect citizens against
harms done them by other citizens. This means protecting people from physical harm, as
the law of spouse and child abuse attempts to do, and from non-physical harms, especially
economic wrongs and psychological injuries." Id.
110. See Shultz, supra note 101, at 214, 218-19 (discussing procedural requirements and
substantive restrictions on marital contracts).
111. See infra note 218 and accompanying text.
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to determine whether they may be extended to or harmonized with a
different tradition. Finally, if there is a conflict between the two that
cannot be reconciled, the court must fashion a resolution that leaves
as much room as possible for changes that will allow the two systems to
coexist.
Typically, the parties present an account of their tradition, sometimes offering competing testimony from specialists or practitioners of
foreign or religious law. The judge deciding the matter evaluates this
evidence and attempts to locate and analyze the dispute within a
larger framework of more familiar legal principles. This is a challenging assignment, and one that courts do not always get right. The process is most successful where it is built on a dynamic conception of
families and cultures that recognizes both tradition and change, respecting diversity and religious norms without losing sight of the core
values of the legal system and the democratic state. As the courts mediate the differences within families and the gaps between cultures,
subtle and important changes are worked into the fabric of family law
rules and traditional cultural practices.
A.

Marriage Traditions

Families celebrate marriage as both a religious and a legal event,
combining traditional ceremonies with whatever procedures are required by state law. 112 Compliance with secular requirements assures
that the state will recognize the marriage, and that the couple will
receive all of the legal benefits attendant on marriage.1 13 The overlay
between secular and religious marriage is explicit in the United States,
where statutes in all states extend authority to religious clergy to solemnize marriages."' When questions of religious practice and authority are raised in marriage cases, American courts have readily
extended respect to less familiar wedding traditions in order to uphold the validity of marriages. Beyond the rules for celebration of
marriages, however, substantive marriage regulations pose more difficult cultural and legal conflicts.
American marriage solemnization statutes are written broadly,
with one common formulation specifying that a marriage may be sol112. See CLARK, supra note 7, at 34-39 (describing statutory regulation of both religious
and legal marriage requirements).
113. Id. at 34-44 (discussing statutory regulation of marriage in America).
114. Id. at 37. Rules for solemnization of marriages in Britain are more complex, with
exceptions to allow for solemnization in accordance with Quaker or Jewish tradition but
not others, such as Catholic, Muslim and Hindu traditions. POULTER, supra note 15, at 3334; LOWE & DOUGLAS, supra note 10, at 38-47.
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emnized in accordance with the traditions of any religious denomination or Indian tribe.1"' In a recent case, a New York state court relied
on First Amendment free exercise principles to construe a marriage
statute broadly to recognize the legal validity of a Hindu marriage celebration." 6 The wedding celebration in Persad v. Balram was a
"Hindu marriage or 'prayer' ceremony" at the bride's home with 100
to 150 guests." 7 "During the ceremony, the parties were adorned in
traditional Hindu wedding garments, prayers were articulated, the defendant's parent's [sic] symbolically gave her to the plaintiff, vows
were made and rings and a flower garland were exchanged."'1 8 At the
conclusion of the two-hour marriage ceremony, the Hindu priest, or
pandit, said a benediction and there was a large wedding reception." 9
After the parties had lived together for seven years and had a child,
the husband sought a declaration that they were never married, based
on their failure to comply with the marriage statute and the argument
that they did not intend to be legally married without a further civil
ceremony. 20 The court rejected these arguments, finding that the
religious marriage ceremony was consistent with statutory requirements and noting the "strong presumption favoring the validity of
marriages." '21
22
In another case, Aghili v. Saadatnejadi,'
the groom negotiated

and signed a marriage contract with the bride's father, and the parties
subsequently obtained a marriage license in Tennessee and had an
Islamic blessing performed by an imam. 2 ' Several weeks after the
blessing, they had a formal wedding reception, and afterward began
115. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-2-109 (1998) (corresponds to the UNIF. MARRIAGE &
DIVORCE ACT § 206(a), 9A U.L.A. 182 (1998)).

116. Persad v. Balram, 724 N.Y.S.2d 560, 563 (Sup. Ct. 2001) ("Subsumed within this
constitutional right is the freedom to be married in accordance with the dictates of one's
own faith.").
117. Id. at 562.
118. Id.
119. Id. The opinion notes that a reception for 275 people followed the wedding and
describes the wedding photos introduced as evidence in the case. Id.
120. Id. at 562.
121. Id. at 565. In an earlier New York case, the court annulled an arranged Hindu
marriage celebrated in India on the basis that an essential part of the ritual-the
saptapadi, or seven steps-was not performed. Singh v. Singh, 325 N.Y.S.2d 590, 590-91
(Sup. Ct. 1971). The evidence indicated that the bride, who opposed the marriage, refused to perform this ritual, and that the parties never consummated the marriage or lived
together as husband and wife. Id. at 591.
122. 958 S.W.2d 784 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).
123. Id. The contract provided for a dowry of 1400 Iranian gold coins and specified that
Aghili, the husband, would pay the wife an additional 10,000 gold coins if he violated any
term of the contract. Id This payment, or sadaq, was described by the court as a postponed dowry designed to protect the wife in the event of divorce. Id. at 786 n.1. In addi-
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living as husband and wife. 124 Within a month, the couple separated,
and a few months later, Aghili filed an action for divorce or annulment in which he disputed the validity of the marriage. 25 He claimed
that an Islamic blessing is not recognized as a legal marriage in Tennessee, that the imam was not the official imam of the mosque, and
that the imam did not return the marriage license to the county clerk
following the ceremony as required by state statutes.1 26 The court rejected Aghili's arguments, relying in part on the affidavit of an Islamic
Studies expert explaining that anyone with the requisite knowledge of
Islamic law is competent to perform religious ceremonies, including
marriage. 121
These cases draw upon a common practice in American courts,
which often sustain the validity of marriages despite defects in licensing or solemnization. 12 Legal presumptions in support of marriage
take many forms, and marriage validation policies are particularly
tion, "[b]ecause Islamic law permits a man to have four wives," Aghili agreed that he would
not marry any other woman if the parties moved back to Iran. Id. at 786.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 785-86.
127. Id. at 788. Tennessee law permits all regular ministers of any denomination to
denomination marriages, and bases this determination on the tenets of the religion involved. Id. at 787. The ruling in Aghili allowed the court to grant a divorce rather than an
annulment of the marriage. Ms. Saadatnejadi alleged that immediately after their honeymoon trip, Mr. Aghili told her that he would not record their marriage license unless she
agreed to sign another agreement relinquishing the sadaq. After she refused, the parties
separated, and several months later Mr. Aghili filed suit seeking a divorce or an annulment. Id. at 786.
128. CLARK, supra note 7, at 40-41. Marriages are sometimes upheld despite the parties'
failure to procure any license at all. See Persad v. Balram, 724 N.Y.S.2d 560, 562, 565 (Sup.
Ct. 2001); Carabetta v. Carabetta, 438 A.2d 109, 111-13 (Conn. 1980) (finding marriage
valid even though the parties never obtained a marriage license).
Note, however, that not all states take this approach to defects in formalization of a
marriage. California has codified a common-law presumption of the validity of a ceremonial marriage, but a party may defeat the presumption by proving that no marriage license
Estate of DePasse, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 143, 155 (Ct. App. 2002). See
was obtained. See, e.g.,
generally CLARK, supra note 7, at 40. A number of states refuse to recognize the authority to
solemnize marriages of ministers "ordained" by the Universal Life Church (ULC). See, e.g.,
Ranieri v. Ranieri, 539 N.Y.S.2d 382, 389 (App. Div. 1989) (refusing to validate a marriage
performed by a ULC minister and citing cases).
The practice in England with regard to formalities is much stricter than in the United
States. See LowE & DOUGLAs, supra note 10, at 82-83. Several recent English cases, however, have applied a presumption of the validity of a marriage based on cohabitation and
31-32 (C.A. 1999)
repute. See Chief Adjudication Officer v. Bath, [2000] Fam. 91, at
(judgment by Evans, L.J.) (requiring "positive, not merely 'clear,' evidence" to rebut the
presumption of a valid marriage based on many years of cohabitation); Pazpena De Vire v.
Pazpena De Vire, [2001] Fam. 95, at 1 9-21, 47-49 (Fam. 2000) (finding insufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of a valid marriage based on 35 years of cohabitation); A34-41 (Fam. 2001) (upholding the presumption of marM v. A-M, [2001] Fam. 495, at
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strong where the parties have shared a life together as husband and
wife.' 29 The tradition of common-law marriage reflects this policy, relying on cohabitation and reputation in the community to uphold the
marriages of couples who never attempted to formalize their relationship.1 30 Injurisdictions with a less open approach to solemnization of
marriages, there is much greater potential for a gap between religious
3
and civil marital status.1
For marriages celebrated in another country, the usual conflict of
laws rule looks to the law of the place of celebration-the lex loci contractus or lex loci celebrationis-todetermine the validity of the marriage
ceremony.'3 2 American courts sometimes extend the presumption
favoring marriage to validate religious or traditional marriages solemnized in another country, despite evidence suggesting that the parties
did not properly follow local rules. l 3 The general conflict of laws
rule is difficult to apply to some marriages that are celebrated with a
series of events that may be spread out over several days or even
134
months.
riage based on the parties' cohabitation in order to give the court the authority to dissolve
the marriage).
129. See, e.g., Carabetta,438 A.2d at 110, 112-13 (upholding a marriage concluded without a license where the parties had lived together for 25 years and had four children).
130. In the small group of states that still recognize common-law marriage, a religious
ceremony is sufficient to demonstrate the parties' present intent to be married. See State v.
Phelps, 652 N.E.2d 1032 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (sustaining marriage based on Islamic ceremony for purpose of spousal testimonial privilege in criminal prosecution).
131. PEARL & MENSKI, supra note 48, at 73-77. Writing about Muslim communities in
Britain, Pearl and Menski describe Muslim family law as an unofficial, parallel system that
does not always incorporate the requirements of English law. Id. Because of the gap between religious and civil law, "most British Muslims today marry twice and divorce twice to
satisfy both legal systems." Id. Those cases in which marriage or divorce does not happen
twice generate a variety of conflicts and confusions. Id.
132. CLARK, supra note 7, at 4143; EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAws § 13.5
(3d ed. 2000) (stating the rule that "a marriage is valid everywhere if valid under the law of
the state where the marriage takes place"). Some jurisdictions have codified this rule by
adopting the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, which stated that "[a]ll marriages contracted within this State prior to the effective date of this Act, or outside this State, that
were valid at the time of the contract or subsequently validated by the laws of the place in
which they were contracted or by the domicile of the parties, are valid in this State." UNIF.
MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 210, 9A U.L.A. 194 (1998). Another approach is to determine
a marriage's validity by looking to "the local law of the state which, with respect to the
particular issue, has the most significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws 2d § 283 (1971).
133. SeeAmsellem v. Amsellem, 730 N.Y.S.2d 212, 215 (Sup. Ct. 2001) (sustaining validity of religious marriage concluded in France without compliance with local formalities);
Xiong ex rel. Edmondson v. Xiong, 648 N.W.2d 900, 901-02 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002) (upholding validity of traditional Hmong marriage ceremony performed in Laos despite lack of
required papers).
134. See, e.g.,
Farah v. Farah, 429 S.E.2d 626, 629 (Va. Ct. App. 1993).
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In Farahv. Farah,after Ahmed and Naima signed a marriage contract described as a "proxy marriage form" (nikah) in Virginia, their
representatives concluded their marriage at an Islamic ceremony held
in England.' 3 5 A month later, the couple went to Pakistan for three
days, where Naima's father held a formal wedding reception (rukhsati), which "symbolize [d] the sending away of the bride with her hus37
band."1 3' 6 They returned to Virginia and separated a year later.'
Ahmed challenged the validity of the marriage because it did not com3 8
ply with the statutory formalities of the Marriage Act of England.'
Naima defended the marriage on the basis that it was valid under the
law of Pakistan, which recognizes marriages performed under Islamic
religious law.13 9 Although the trial court agreed with Naima and upheld the marriage, the court of appeals reversed, concluding that the
reception had no legal significance in Islamic law and, therefore, that
the marriage was not performed in Pakistan and could not be upheld
140
under either Pakistani or Islamic law.

Although Farahappears to be a routine application of the traditional choice of law rule, allowing a husband to repudiate his marriage on this basis runs contrary to the strong marriage validation
principle in American law.'
Reliance on the law of England-as the
lex loci-to invalidate the marriage in circumstances in which the marriage was concluded in three stages-and in three places-seems arbitrary and unnecessary.' 4 2 There are strong social and cultural reasons
to recognize and sustain a marriage43seriously entered into within the
formalities of a different tradition.1
Validation principles also come into play where there are challenges to the substantive validity of a marriage rather than to its formalization. Here as well, religious and cultural traditions vary
135. Id. at 627.
136. Id. at 628.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 628-29.
140. Id. at 627-29. As a result of the ruling, Naima was not entitled to a divorce decree
or to equitable distribution of the parties' property. Id. at 630.
141. See CLARK,supra note 7, at 41-44 (citing ALBERT EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICr OF LAws, 7879 (1962)).
142. Arguably, the English law would validate a marriage in this situation. See Taczanowska v. Taczanowski, 2 All E.R. 563, 566, 573 (C.A. 1957) (finding a marriage valid as an
English common-law marriage where a couple from Poland was married in Italy in a religious ceremony that did not satisfy either Italian or Polish requirements).
143. See CLARK, supra note 7, at 43 (finding that "very strong public policy in favor of
upholding marriage[ ] [exists], especially where the parties have behaved in all respects as
if married").
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widely.144 Marriages between uncle and niece or aunt and nephew,
prohibited in many American jurisdictions, are sometimes permitted
where they are consistent with particular religious or cultural traditions. 145 First cousin marriages, which are prohibited in many states,
are permitted across Europe, and certain types of cousin marriage are
preferred unions in a range of cultures including many in the Islamic
world.' 4 6 Under traditional conflict of laws principles, capacity to
marry is governed by the law of the parties' place of domicile (/ex
domicilii), and foreign marriages intended to evade local marriage
prohibitions may be deemed to be void. 147 This rule is subject to exceptions, based on a balancing of the marriage validation principle
148
against the policies embedded in substantive marriage regulations.
Notably, the normative standards set by international human
rights conventions do not include marriage restrictions based on consanguinity or affinity.1 49 The fact that there is very little consensus
about these standards around the world or within the United States
suggests that, beyond a core of nearly universal marriage prohibitions,
150
the public policy interests supporting these laws are relatively weak.
The fact that these rules are derived primarily from religious and not
144. See supra notes 14-20 and accompanying text (discussing marriage requirements in
different religious traditions).
145. Rhode Island permits marriages for persons of the Jewish faith "within the degrees
of affinity or consanguinity allowed by their religion." R.I. GEN. LAws § 15-14 (1996). See
In re May's Estate, 114 N.E.2d 4 (N.Y. 1953). The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act contains an exception for uncle-niece or aunt-nephew marriages "permitted by the established
customs of aboriginal cultures." 9A U.L.A. 183 (1998). This provision is in effect in several
states. See, e.g., CoLo. REV. STAT. § 14-2-110(1)(c) (1997).
146. MARTIN OTrENHEIMER, FORBIDDEN RELATIVES: THE AMERICAN MY[H OF COUSIN MARRIAGE 90, 142 (1996).
147. CLARK, supra note 7, at 86.
148. Compare Catalano v. Catalano, 170 A.2d 726, 728-29 (Conn. 1961) (finding that an
uncle-niece marriage celebrated in Italy was against Connecticut's public policy even
though the marriage was valid in Italy), with In re May's Estate, 114 N.E.2d 4, 7 (N.Y. 1953)
(upholding an uncle-niece marriage performed in Rhode Island where marriage was valid
under the laws of Rhode Island). See generally CLARK, supra note 7, at 85-87; Alan Reed, The
Essential Validity ofMarriage: The Application of Interest Analysis and Depecage to Anglo American
Choice of Law Rules, 20 N.Y. L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 387, 431-34 (2000) (describing
different countries' policies towards enforcement of marriage rules).
149. The Convention on Consent to Marriage, supra note 75, 521 U.N.T.S. at 232-39,
prohibits marriages of children and marriages entered into without the full consent of the
parties. Id. arts. 1, 2, 521 U.N.T.S. at 234. Under a private international law treaty, contracting states may refuse recognition of marriages when one of the parties was already
married or where the spouses are related "by blood or by adoption, in the direct line or as
brother and sister." Hague Conference on Private International Law: Convention on Celebration and Recognition of the Validity of Marriages, art. 11, openedfor signature,Oct. 1,
1977, 16 I.L.M. 18, 18 [hereinafter Hague Convention on Marriage Validity].
150. OTTENHEIMER, supra note 146, argues that modern genetic evidence establishes that
there is no special risk to children of cousin marriages, and suggests that prohibitions on
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secular norms further undermines the case for enforcement in situations that present strong reasons to validate a marriage.
Applying similar principles, American and English courts have
recognized foreign polygamous marriages for limited purposes if the
marriage was valid where celebrated and where the parties were domiciled. 15 A polygamous foreign marriage is sufficiently valid to prevent the married party from marrying again in the United States while
a previous partner is living and undivorced, 152 and may be given effect
for purposes such as determining inheritance or worker's compensation claims.153 In terms of international law, the status of polygamy is
more complex. While international agreements that address marriage
and family issues do not address polygamy, it is generally understood
to violate the guarantees of gender equality in marriage that are expressly articulated in these instruments. 154 The United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women has
argued that polygamous marriages ought to be discouraged and

prohibited. 155
cousin marriage in the United States can be traced to a policy of promoting assimilation of
foreign immigrants.
151. See CLARK, supra note 7, at 69-70 (discussing difficulties encountered by persons in
polygamous marriages who come to the United States or England); SCOLES, supra note 132,
at § 13.16; Reed, supra note 148, at 437-44 (discussing the application of American and
English law to polygamous marriages); see also POULTER, supra note 15, at 44-65.
152. See In re Sood, 142 N.Y.S.2d 591 (Sup. Ct. 1955) (finding a marriage entered into in
India valid so as to refuse to allow the husband to marry a second woman in New York,
while his first wife remained living and undivorced in India).
153. See In re Dalip Singh Bir's Estate, 188 P.2d 499, 502 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1948) (inheritance); Royal v. Cudahy Packing Co., 190 N.W. 427, 428-29 (Iowa 1922) (worker's
compensation).
Courts are unlikely to recognize these marriages in either criminal or immigration
law. See, e.g., People v. Ezeonu, 588 N.Y.S.2d 116 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (rejecting defendant's
contention that he had a valid polygamous marriage under Nigerian law with the thirteenyear-old complainant in statutory rape prosecution); In re Mujahid, 15 I. & N. Dec. 546,
546-47 (BIA 1976) (polygamous marriage not valid to confer preferential immigration
status).
The practice of temporary marriage, or muta, is far more controversial. See In re Marriage of Vryonis, 248 Cal. Rptr. 807, 814-15 (Ct. App. 1988) (refusing to treat muta as a
putative marriage). Muta is also considered in a Canadian custody dispute. Y.J. v. N.J.,
[1994] O.J. No. 2359 (discussed in Pascale Fournier, The Erasure of Islamic Difference in Canadian and American Family Law Adjudication, 10 J.L. & POL'v 51, 59-63 (2001)). See generally
Tamilla F. Ghodsi, Tying a Slipknot: Temporary Marriages in Iran, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 645
(1994) (giving a critical analysis of muta in Iran).
154. See supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
155. According to the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women:
Polygamous marriage contravenes a woman's right to equality with men, and can
have such serious emotional and financial consequences for her and her dependents that such marriages ought to be discouraged and prohibited. The Commit-
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Marriage celebration traditions of diverse groups are relatively
easy to accommodate within the American legal tradition. Upholding
the validity of Hindu or Islamic marriages honors the choices and expectations of the parties and their communities and frequently serves
to protect a financially vulnerable spouse who might otherwise be left
without a remedy. 156 The same arguments support providing some
measure of recognition to marriages, validly contracted in other jurisdictions, that contravene our religiously-derived norms barring consanguineous or polygamous marriage.
In a post-colonial,
interdependent world, marked by global travel and migration, public
policy may no longer demand such a narrow and parochial view of
marriage.
The question of whether American family laws should be
amended to permit celebration of polygamous marriages raises issues
that are beyond the scope of what can be addressed through the common law process described in this Article. Despite its religious origins,
the equation of marriage and monogamy is deeply embedded in secular practice and the broad framework of American law. 157 Any legislation respecting polygamy that applied across cultural and religious
groups would bring opposing traditions into conflict and raise enormous practical challenges. However, legislation that applied only to
particular religious or cultural groups would violate the norms of a
universal family law and of separation of church and state.1 58 Moreover, because polygamy as it is practiced around the world is almost
exclusively the prerogative of men, laws establishing this practice

tee notes with concern that some States parties, whose constitutions guarantee
equal rights, permit polygamous marriage in accordance with personal or customary law. This violates the constitutional rights of women, and breaches the provisions of article 5(a) of the Convention.
United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General
Recommendation No. 21, para. 14 (13th Sess. 1994), available at http://www.un.org/
womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recomm.htm [hereinafter General Recommendation No. 21].
156. None of the formalization cases discussed here refer to any substantive or religious
objections to the validity of a ceremonial marriage. Several opinions suggest clear financial
motives for disputing the validity of a marriage. See, e.g., Aghili v. Saadatnejadi, 958 S.W.2d
784, 786 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997) (noting wife's allegation that husband had refused to record marriage license unless she agreed to relinquish sadaq); Xiong ex rel. Edmondson v.
Xiong, 648 N.W.2d 900, 900 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002) (describing dispute between father and
children concerning right to bring claim for the wrongful death of mother).
157. See supra notes 26-38 and accompanying text (describing the religious and political
history of monogamy in the United States).
158. While Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), does not present a constitutional
barrier to state laws instituting polygamous marriage, the First Amendment bar on establishment of religion would make it difficult to enact a law that allowed polygamy but limited it to certain groups. See id. at 166-67.
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equality established under both inwould contradict norms of gender
59
ternational and domestic law.1

Issues of marital age and consent also raise questions of cultural
accommodation; here, as well, important international standards reinforce the limitations of domestic laws. In some traditions, a father or
guardian has authority to consent to marriage on behalf of his child
or ward.16 ° In this situation, the claims of family and community may
be at odds with an individual's right, recognized by international law,
to give "free and full consent to marriage",1 6 t and with a child's rights
to protection and autonomy. 6 2 CEDAW explicitly prohibits the betrothal or marriage of children.' 6 3 In other traditions, family members play a significant role in arranging marriages, but as long as the
final decision remains with the prospective bride and groom this practice should be unobjectionable. 6 4
A pluralist approach, which respects cultural traditions such as
arranged marriage, should also respect the constraints of legal rules
designed to protect an individual's ultimate right to make this decision. 1 65 Marriages that violate the principle of free and full consent
1 66
are appropriately set aside on the basis of lack of consent or duress.
159. See supra notes 154-155 and accompanying text.
160. See generally Annie Bunting, Child Marriage,in 2 WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAw 669 (Kelly D. Askin & Dorean M. Koenig eds., 2000) (considering issues sur-

rounding the early marriage of girls and young women in cultures around the world).
161. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
162. See CRC, supra note 79 and accompanying text. See generally Bunting, supra note
160, at 683-88 (discussing the consequences of marriage for young girls).
163. CEDAW, supra note 76, art. 16(2), 1249 U.N.T.S. at 20 ("The betrothal and the
marriage of a child shall have no legal effect, and all necessary action, including legislation,
shall be taken to specify a minimum age for marriage and to make the registration of
marriages in an official registry compulsory.").
164. Arranged marriages are common within the Indian-American community. See
Paula Span, Marriage at First Sight, WASH. POST MAG., Feb. 23, 2003, available at 2003 WL
13334278. For a fictional account of an arranged marriage in a HasidicJewish community
in New York, see PEARL ABRAHAM, THE ROMANCE READER 210-25 (1995).
165. See In the Marriage of S, 5 Fam. L. R. 831 (Austl. Fam. Ct. 1980).
She, and not her parents, has the right to choose whom she shall marry. That is a
right to self-sovereignty to which culture, religion and family must bow. Parents
may oppose, persuade, influence and even arrange, but the decision whom one
shall marry is the right of that person alone.
Id.
166. See Singh v. Singh, 325 N.Y.S.2d 590, 592 (Sup. Ct. 1971) (annulling an arranged
Hindu marriage when the bride had opposed the marriage, refused to perform essential
ritual and told the plaintiff she was not his wife); see also Hirani v. Hirani, 4 F.L.R. 232 (C.A.
1982) (annulling marriage because nineteen-year-old's parents' threats forced her to agree
to marriage). See generally CLARK, supra note 7, at 103-05 (describing use of duress can be
used to invalidate a marriage contract in the United States and England); POULTER, supra
note 15, at 27-33 (explaining use of duress in invalidating marriages in England).
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Marriages in violation of the statutory minimum age, however, present
a more complex situation. While such marriages can be annulled,' 6 7
many youthful marriages are legally valid in the United States under
minimum age statutes, which vary widely among the states. Some
states permit marriages of young teenagers with parental consent and,
in some cases, the approval of a court.168 In other cases involving
youthful marriages, particularly when the facts suggest some level of
parental coercion, a state may institute child protection proceedings
against parents. 69 Courts bear a particularly important responsibility
in these cases to balance the claims of tradition against the strong
public policies to protect children.
International family law reflects the tension between upholding
marriages and enforcing substantive marriage regulations. The
United Nations Marriage Convention provides that "[n]o marriage
shall be legally entered into by any person under" the specified minimum age for marriage, but it does not invalidate marriages which violate this principle."7 ° The Hague Marriage Convention provides a
conflict of laws rule based on a broad policy favoring marriage, but
permits states to deny recognition in circumstances of polygamy,
167. E.g., B v. L, 168 A.2d 90, 92 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1961) (granting annulment
where sixteen-year-old was taken to Italy and married there; marriage was not consummated and plaintiff returned to U.S. five weeks later).
168. See generally CLARK, supra note 7, at 88-98 (discussing history and application of
marital age statutes in the United States). Marriages of young American teenagers typically
involve a pregnant bride. See Chris Burritt, N.C. May Raise Minimum Age for Marriages,ATLANTAJ.-CONsT., Apr. 26, 2001, at 6A (reporting that more than 200 thirteen-year-olds were
married in North Carolina in 1998); Amy Argetsinger, Assembly Votes to Ban Some Teen Marriages, WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 1999, at C4, available at 1999 WL 2210413 (discussing Maryland's decision to raise the minimum age requirement for marriage to fifteen years old).
The English common law, which permitted marriage of girls as young as twelve and boys as
young as fourteen, was adopted in all of the American colonies. GROSSBERG, supra note 9,
at 105-06. During the nineteenth century, many state legislatures raised these ages. Id. at
14144. For a discussion of the current English law, see POULTER, supra note 15, at 18-22.
169. See, e.g., Re KR (1999) [2] FLR 542 (Family Division) (entering wardship orders
where sixteen-year-old abducted to India by her parents in order to force her to marry);
People v. Benu, 385 N.Y.S.2d 222 (Crim. Ct. 1976) (sustaining child endangerment conviction where defendant arranged marriage of thirteen-year-old daughter).
The issue also surfaces periodically in criminal prosecutions. E.g., State v. Moua, 573
N.W.2d 202 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997) (statutory rape conviction following traditional Hmong
marriage to thirteen- or sixteen-year-old girl); J.L. Schmidt, Iraqifather is jailedfor 'marrying
off 2 young girls, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Nov. 20, 1996, at A16 (reporting the arrest
of Iraqi father who forced his thirteen- and fourteen-year-old daughters to marry older
men). Regarding Hmong marriage traditions, see generally Deidre Evans-Pritchard and
Alison Dundes Renteln, The Interpretation and Distortion of Culture: A Hmong "Marriageby
Capture" Case in Fresno, California,4 S.CAL. IN-rERDISC. L.J. 1 (1994); see alsoJulie Cart, Incest
Trial Sheds Light on Polygamy in Utah, L.A. TIMES, June 4, 1999 at A3.
170. Convention on Consent to Marriage, supra note 75, art. 2, 521 U.N.T.S. at 234.

2004]

PLURALISM IN AMERICAN FAMILY LAW

nonage, or lack of free consent.' 7 ' By considering these disputes on a
case-by-case basis, American courts achieve the same sort of balance
between the broader principles of family law and the individual circumstances of particular families. Courts extend recognition more
readily to marriages that have given rise to settled expectations between the parties and their families, even where those marriages were
solemnized within a different tradition or in a distant time or place.
B.

Religion and Divorce

After a century of social and legal change, access to divorce today
has come to be seen as a civil right.172 As courts and legislatures have
liberalized divorce laws, they have pushed aside the religious objections of earlier eras, and today either husband or wife can readily secure a civil divorce despite the other's opposition. 7 3 In the Islamic
and Jewish traditions, which have tolerated divorce for many centuries, divorce has been a husband's prerogative. 1 74 Within these traditions, there are protections for wives against the moral and financial
hardships of divorce. 1 75 These protections are different from those
which have developed in the American system, however, and reconciling different cultural approaches to divorce has proved to be a difficult project.
1. MaritalAgreements.-In both Islamic and Jewish practice, marriage has a strong contractual dimension. One aspect of this practice
is a written agreement, typically concluded as part of the formalization
of the marriage, which includes provisions for payments to the wife in
the event of divorce. 76 The enforceability of these agreements in civil
171. Hague Convention on Marriage Validity, supra note 149, art. 11, 16 I.L.M. at 18.
172. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 382-83 (1971) (describing divorce as "the
adjustment of a fundamental human relationship" and holding that mandatory filing fees
violate due process rights of those who cannot afford to pay).
173. See, e.g., Sharma v. Sharma, 667 P.2d 395 (Kan. Ct. App. 1983). The Sharma court
sustained a divorce decree despite the wife's objection that their Hindu religion did not
recognize divorce. Il at 396. The wife claimed that "if she returns to India as a divorced
woman, her family and friends will treat her as though she were dead." Id. at 395.
174. See Wegner, supra note 68, at 15-18.
175. Id. at 21-22.
176. Id. Historically, this payment was made to the bride's father or guardian. Id. In
many Jewish communities, this amount is now a small token payment. Irving Breitowitz,
The Plight of the Agunah: A Study in Halacha, Contract, and the First Amendment, 51 MD. L.
REv. 312, 371 (1992), but see In re Marriage of Noghrey discussed infra. In contemporary
settings, the payment specified in Islamic marital agreements may at times also be intended
to be symbolic. Lindsey E. Blenkhorn, Note, Islamic MarriageContracts in American Courts:
InterpretingMahr Agreements as Prenuptials and Their Effect on Muslim Women, 76 S. CAL. L.
REv. 189, 204 (2002).
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divorce proceedings is a recurring question on which American courts
have reached notably different conclusions. In three separate decisions, the California Court of Appeals has denied enforcement in a
variety of circumstances on the basis of public policy. In the first of
these cases, In re Marriageof Noghrey,' 77 a wife sought to enforce a written promise made by her husband immediately before their marriage
to settle on her, in the event of a divorce, his house in Sunnyvale,
California and "$500,000.00 or one-half of [his] assets, whichever
[was] greater."' 7 8 The court described this as a Jewish marriage contract, or kethuba, traditionally intended to provide economic security
179
for the wife because the husband was entitled to divorce her at will.

At trial, most of the evidence concerned whether the husband had
been coerced into signing the agreement, with the trial court concluding that the agreement was validly made. 8 ° On appeal, however, the
court refused to enforce the agreement, based on the rule that premarital agreements that encourage or promote divorce are against
public policy.' 8 ' Noting the wife's testimony that neither she nor her
parents possessed great wealth, the court concluded that "[t]he prospect of receiving a house and a minimum of $500,000 by obtaining
the no-fault divorce available in California would menace the marriage of the best intentioned spouse.""12'
Several years later, the court reached a similar result in In re Mar8 Dajani involved an Islamic proxy marriage contract
riage of Dajani.1
that provided for payment to the wife in the event of the husband's
death or a divorce of a dower with a value of 5000 Jordanian dinars,
equivalent to about $1700.184 The husband offered testimony of an
imam as an expert on Islam, that a wife who initiated divorce proceedings forfeited the right to her marriage payment. 8 5 The trial court
accepted this view, concluding that the dowry agreement was valid but
177. 215 Cal. Rptr. 153 (Ct. App. 1985).
178. Id. at 154.
179. Id. at 155 n.2.
180. Id. at 156-57.
181. Id. at 155-57. The court recognized that the agreement would discourage the husband from seeking a divorce, but concluded that it would have the opposite effect on the
wife. Id. at 156. For a criticism of the court's reasoning in Noghrey, see Gloria M. Sanchez,
A ParadigmShift in Legal Education: PreparingLaw Studentsfor the Twenty-First Century: Teaching Foreign Law, Culture, and Legal Language of the Major U.S. American Trading Partners, 34
SAN DIEGO L. REv. 635, 653-56 (1997).
182. Id. at 157. The fact that the wife filed for divorce after only seven-and-a-half
months of marriage certainly did not help her case. Id. at 154.
183. 251 Cal. Rptr. 871 (Ct. App. 1988).
184. See id. at 871 & n.3.
185. Id. at 871-72.
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that the wife could not enforce the agreement because she had filed
for divorce.' 8 6 Citing Noghrey, the court concluded in dicta that if the
wife's interpretation of the agreement was correct it would be unenforceable in any event because it encouraged "'profiteering by divorce."" 8 7 Although the court did not acknowledge that the amounts
in dispute in Noghrey and Dajani were dramatically different, a more
recent decision from the court rejected the holding in Dajani on the
basis that "[a] dowry worth only $1,700, payable upon dissolution, is
'
insufficient to seriously jeopardize a viable marriage." 188
On the facts of both Noghrey and Dajani,enforcement of the marital agreement would have benefited the wife, and commentators have
criticized each of these cases for denying enforcement."8 9 In a third
case, however, the wife opposed enforcement of the agreement. In re
Marriageof Shaban 9 ° considered the husband's claim for enforcement
of an agreement, entered into by the parties at the time of their marriage in Egypt in 1974, which provided for the wife to recover a marriage payment, also known as a mahr or sadaq, of 500 Egyptian
pounds.' 9 At the time of their divorce in 1998, the parties had lived
in the United States for seventeen years.19 2 The mahr was worth about
$30, while the marital estate had a value of approximately three mil3
19

lion dollars.

The court in Shaban considered several English translations of the
marriage document, which recited the amount of the mahrbut had no
substantive terms addressing marital property rights or property division in the event of divorce."' The husband attempted to introduce
186. Id. at 872.
187. Id. at 872-73. For a criticism of the court's reasoning in Dajani,see Ghada G. Qaisi,
Note, Religious MarriageContracts:JudicialEnforcement of Mahr Agreements in American Courts,
15 J.L. & RELIGION 67, 77-80 (2000-01).
188. In re Marriage of Bellio, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 556, 559 (Ct. App. 2003). In Bellio, the
court enforced a secular prenuptial agreement requiring the husband to pay the wife
$100,000 upon divorce. Id. at 559-60. The court found that the provision did not violate
public policy, because its purpose was "to ensure that, if husband died or the marriage was
dissolved, wife would be no worse off than she would have been had she remained single."
Id. at 560.
189. See Sanchez, supra note 181, at 655-56 (criticizing the Noghrey decision); Qaisi, supra
note 187, at 77-80 (criticizing the Dajanidecision). But see Blenkhorn, supra note 176, at
206-07 (analyzing the merits of the Noghrey and Dajani decisions).
190. 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 863 (Ct. App. 2001).
191. Id. at 865-66.
192. Id. at 865.
193. Id. at 866, 870; see $30 Dowry No Prenup, Appellate Court Rules, SAN DIEGO UNIONTRIB., Apr. 14, 2001, at A3, available at 2001 WL 6454416 (reporting that the husband's
estate in Shaban was estimated to be three million dollars).
194. Shaban, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 865-67.
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as parol evidence the testimony of an expert witness in order to establish that the language of the agreement "signified a written intention
by the parties to have the property relations governed by 'Islamic law,'
which provides that the earnings and accumulations of each party during a marriage remain that party's separate property."'9 5 The trial
court refused to allow the testimony, concluding that the document
was not a binding prenuptial agreement, and proceeded to apply California community property law to divide the estate.19 6 The California
Court of Appeal affirmed, noting that "[a]n agreement whose only
substantive term in any language is that the marriage has been made
in accordance with 'Islamic law' is hopelessly uncertain as to its terms
and conditions."197
Other courts have been more willing to enforce terms of Islamic
marital agreements. A New York court concluded in Aziz v. Aziz' 98
that a contract for a mahrwas enforceable in a divorce action despite
the fact that the parties entered into the agreement under Islamic law
as a part of a religious ceremony.1 99 In Akileh v. Elchahal,2 °° a Florida
court allowed a wife to recover a sadaqof $50,000, which was promised
in an agreement made between the groom and the wife's father prior
to the marriage. 2 ' At trial, there was contradictory testimony concerning the circumstances in which a wife forfeits the right to her
sadaq,and the trial court concluded there had been no meeting of the
minds on the terms of the agreement.20 2 The appellate court re195. Id. at 866-67. As the Court noted, "In practical effect, that would mean that there
would be no community interest in Ahmad's medical practice or retirement accounts." Id.
196. Id. at 865.
197. Id. at 865. The court noted in a footnote that there are at least four different
schools of interpretation of Islamic law, and that courts in England have rejected any attempt to give effect to Islamic personal law because of the variety of these competing approaches. Id. at 868 n.4. In addition, the court held that the writing must state its terms in
greater certainty in order to satisfy the statute of frauds. Id. at 868; see also Chaudhary v.
Ali, No. 0956-94-4, 1995 WL 40079, at *1-2 (Va. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 1995) (refusing a husband's request to enforce a marriage contract or nikah nama that did not make "fair and
reasonable provision" for the spouse or provide full disclosure of the husband's assets)
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Habibi-Fahnrich v. Fahnrich, No. 46186/193,
1995 WL 507388, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 10, 1995) (holding that terms of sadaq were not
sufficiently definite to enforce).
198. 488 N.Y.S.2d 123 (Sup. Ct. 1985).
199. Id. at 124. Evidently the wife, described as "defendant" in the opinion, was not the
party filing for divorce in this case.
200. 666 So. 2d 246 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
201. Id. at 247, 249.
202. Id. at 247-48. The claim for divorce was filed by the wife, who testified that a wife
forfeited her marriage payment only if she cheated on her husband. Id. The wife's expert
testified that her right to receive the sadaqwas not negated if she filed for divorce, and her
father testified that a wife had an absolute fight to request the payment from her husband
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versed, however, holding that the parties had understood and agreed
to the essential terms of the contract, and remanded the case for entry
20 3
of judgment in the wife's favor.

In a NewJersey case, Odatalla v. Odatalla,2 ° 4 the court ordered the
husband to pay a mahr of $10,000.25 The evidence included a videotape of the marriage ceremony that showed the families of the bride
and groom negotiating and signing the mahr agreement. 20 6 Rejecting
the husband's Establishment Clause defense, the court noted that
"the challenge faced by our courts today is in keeping abreast of the
evolution of our community from a mostly homogenous group of religiously and ethnically similar members to today's diverse community. ' 20 7 The court held that "[a] greements, though arrived at as part

of a religious ceremony of any particular faith," are enforceable if they
are (1) "capable of specific performance under 'neutral principles of
law"' and (2) if "the agreement in question meets the state's standards
for those 'neutral principles of law.' ,208 Finding that "all of the essential elements of a contract [were] present," the court approved en20 9
forcement of the mahr.
Courts in other countries have also debated the enforceability of
a sadaq or mahr agreement. A 1965 English case allowed enforcement
of an agreement to pay mahr
As a matter of policy, I would incline to the view that, there
being now so many Mohammedans resident in this country,
it is better that the court should recognise in favour of women who have come here as a result of a Mohammedan marriage the right to obtain from their husband what was
promised to them by enforcing the contract and payment of
what was so promised, than that they should be bereft of
those rights and receive no assistance from the English
courts.2 10

whenever she desired, but especially in the event of a divorce. Id. The husband testified
that his understanding, based on his sister's experience, was that a wife was not entitled to
a sadaq if she sought a divorce, unless she had been abused. Id. at 248.
203. Id. at 249.
204. 810 A.2d 93 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2002).
205. Id. at 98.
206. Id. at 95.
207. Id. at 96.
208. Id. at 98; see also id. at 95-96 (citing Jones v. Wolf, 44 U.S. 595 (1979)).
209. Id. at 98. The husband also argued that the term "postponed" concerning the balance due under the agreement was too vague to be enforced; the court approved the use
of parol evidence to determine the meaning of this term. Id.
210. Shahnaz v. Rizwan, I Q.B. 390, 401-02 (1964); see POULTER, supra note 15, at 129-30
(discussing English courts' power to enforce these agreements); PEARL & MENSES, supra
note 48, at 232-34 (discussing English Mahr cases).
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More recently, a Canadian court declined to enforce an Islamic
marriage contract that provided for a $30,000 deferred mahr payment.2 1 The court found that enforcement of the mahr was "fundamentally an Islamic religious matter" and "unsuitable for adjudication
in the civil courts."2'12 The court's conclusion seems to have been influenced by the testimony of several experts that a Muslim wife could
lose her right to mahr in certain circumstances, and that disputes over
the obligation of mahr should be resolved according to Islamic relig2

ious principles.

1 3

Courts deciding these cases struggle with problems of cultural
and legal context. The California opinions note that in Islamic tradition a husband has the right to divorce his wife unilaterally, while a
wife's right to divorce is far more limited. 4 Traditionally, the mahr
or sadaq served as financial protection for the wife in the event the
husband exercised this right.2" 5 Taken out of their original context,
the agreements present a dilemma. To the extent they are analogous
to the premarital agreements known in American law, courts are understandably inclined to ask about disclosure, parol evidence, and the
statute of frauds.2 16 But, to the extent these are subject to Islamic law,
they are not like other marital agreements. Thus, courts are understandably hesitant to interpret or enforce them, particularly if the experts called by the parties themselves have different views of what
Islamic law requires in a given situation. 7
In those countries with systems of Islamic personal law, a religious
court can determine whether a wife is entitled to divorce, whether
payment of mahr is required, and what other remedies may be appropriate. In a state like California, however, there is nothing to prevent
a wife from seeking her own unilateral divorce, and no recognized
211. Kaddoura v. Hammoud, [1998] 168 D.L.R. (4th) 503, 510-12 (Ont. Gen. Div.).
The case is analyzed and criticized in Pascale Fournier, supra note 153, at 59-63.
212. Kaddoura, 168 D.L.R. (4th) at 510-11.
213. Id. at 507-08. The marriage, which lasted only eighteen months, involved a young
couple who turned out to have "fairly incompatible personalities" and no substantial income or property. Id. at 505. The husband did make a $5000 mahrpayment due before
the marriage; the couple used the money for a honeymoon trip to Jamaica. Id. at 509.
214. See In reMarriage of Noghrey, 215 Cal. Rptr. 153, 155 n.2 (Ct. App. 1985) (discussing ketubah as a device to provide economic security for the wife); see also In re Marriage of
Dajani, 251 Cal. Rptr. 871, 872 (1988) (citing Noghrey).
215. Noghrey, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 155 n.2.
216. E.g., Akileh v. Elchahal, 666 So. 2d 246, 248-49 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (discussing
a premarital agreement in contract terms).
217. Note the court's observation in Shaban that the term "Islamic law" is uncertain
given the different schools of interpretation of Islamic law and the further variations
among different Islamic nations. In re Marriage of Shaban, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 863, 868 n.4
(Ct. App. 2001).
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source of Islamic legal authority to evaluate her claim for mahr or
sadaq. In the United States, where a spouse may be entitled to support
orders and marital or community property division under state law, it
is not easy to determine whether enforcement of mahr or sadaq should
substitute for these remedies.2 1 8
Contemporary Islamic marital agreements often reflect new expectations and circumstances, 219 and Muslim communities in the
United States actively debate how to adapt its traditions to the American legal environment. 220 This fits within a larger trend in contemporary Islamic societies of using stipulations in marriage contracts to
protect wives against various contingencies.2 2 1 One option is to draft
agreements that are a better "fit" with American law;22 2 another is to

218. See Asifa Quraishi & Najeeba Syced-Miller, No Altars: A Survey of Islamic Family Law in
the United States, Part III B, at http://www.law.emory.edu/IFL/cases/USA.htm (last visited
Mar. 5, 2004) (describing the intersection of Islamic law and American family law as it
relates to mahr and sadaq). Islamic law may also provide additional remedies, including
support during a three-month period after talaq is pronounced, and possibly a claim for
compensation for services provided to the husband during the marriage. See id. at Part II E
(describing historical compensation arrangements in Islamic law); see also PEARL & MENSKI,
supra note 48, at 190-228 (discussing mahr and other remedies under South Asian Muslim
law).
219. For example, the agreement in the Aghili case provided that the husband would
not marry anyone else if the parties returned to live in Iran. Aghili v. Saadatnejadi, 958
S.W.2d 784, 786 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997), discussed supra notes 122-127 and accompanying
text.
220. Julia Lieblich, Muslim Leaders Back Marriage Contracts,CHIc. TRIB., Aug. 31, 2001, at
1, available at 2001 WL 4109886; see Carol Weisbrod, Universals and Particulars:A Comment on
Women's Human Rights and Religious Marriage Contracts,9 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD.

77, 88-94 (1999) (discussing use of contractual agreements by Islamic women). These issues have also been addressed in a global study of Islamic family law directed by Abdullhi
an-Na'im of the Law and Religion Program of Emory University. Quraishi & Syeed-Miller,
supra note 218, at Part III B; see also Kecia Ali, ProgressiveMuslims and IslamicJurisprudence:
The Necessity for CriticalEngagement with Marriage and Divorce Law, in PROGRESSIvE MUSLIMS:
ON JUSTICE, GENDER, AND PLURALISM (Omid Safi ed., 2003) (describing conflicts between
the approaches of Islamic neoconservatives and feminist or reformist Islamic theorists).
221. See generally Lucy Carroll, Talaq-Tafwid and Stipulations in a Muslim MarriageContract:
Important Means of Protecting the Positionof the South Asian Muslim Wife, 16 MOD. ASIAN STUD.
277, 283-300 (1982).
222. Quraishi & Syeed-Miller, supra note 218, at Part III B; see also SHACHAR, supra note
48, at 60 n.63, 76 n.48. A forthcoming book by Azizah al-Hibri of the University of Richmond promises to be enormously helpful both to courts and individuals considering the
use of Islamic marriage contracts. A lecture presented by al-Hibri that discusses her upcoming book is available online. Azizah al-Hibri, Muslim Marriage Contract in American
Courts, Speech at the Minaret of Freedom Banquet (May 20, 2000), at http://www.
karamah.org/sp/azizah-20000520.php [hereinafter al-Hibri Speech]. For a critique of
this approach, see Ali, supra note 220 (noting limitations on use of contractual stipulations
under Islamic jurisprudence.
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expand alternatives for religious marital dispute resolution.2 23 Writing about institutions such as the Islamic Shari'a Council in Britain,
David Pearl and Werner Menski have described "a new form of shari'a,
English Muslim law or angrezi shariat,which remains officially unrecognized by the state but is now increasingly in evidence as a dominant
legal force within the various Muslim communities in Britain."2 2' 4 This
new English Muslim law includes informal dispute resolution in divorce cases. 2 2 5 These options may be especially important for women,
who are vulnerable in divorce both when the mahr or sadaq is not enforceable and when a marital agreement is used to bypass the protections of the civil divorce law. 2 2 6 It will be important to determine,
227
however, how women are treated in these tribunals.
Taken together, these cases reject the view that enforcement of a
mahror sadaqagreement necessarily entangles the courts in a religious
question or violates public policy. At one end of the spectrum, the
Dajanicase suggests that an extremely generous settlement, far in excess of what the state's community property rules would provide, may
be unenforceable under ordinary rules of public policy.228 At the
other end of the continuum, the Shaban case suggests that the attempt
to drastically curtail a spouse's financial rights under the general divorce or inheritance laws will not prevail unless the parties clearly express this limitation and ensure that the agreement complies fully with

223. See, e.g., Jabri V. Qaddura, 108 S.W.3d 404 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003) (sustaining parties'
agreement to arbitrate all issues in their divorce before the Texas Islamic Court in Richardson, Tex); see Quraishi & Syeed-Miller, supra note 218, at Part W (advocating the use of
local Muslim tribunals to resolve family disputes).
224. PEARL & MENSKI, supra note 48, at 58.
225. Id.
226. The American case law discussed here suggests that courts are more readily prepared to enforce a mahr or sadaq agreement when a husband is seeking divorce and enforcement will protect rather than harm the wife. The problems of context are particularly
severe in a case like Shaban, where the parties' domicile and circumstances have changed
dramatically since making the agreement. See In re Marriage of Shaban, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d
863, 870 (Ct App. 2001) (ruling for the divorced wife when the estate had grown to approximately $3 million).
227. See Lucy Carroll, Muslim Women and 'IslamicDivorce' in England, 17J. MUSLIM MINORIrY AFFAIRS 97 (1997) (arguing that the Islamic Sahria Council has imposed an unnecessarily harsh interpretation of Islamic law on women in divorce cases); see also the discussion
infra at notes 267-277 and accompanying text (discussing experiences of Jewish wives in
rabbinic tribunals).
228. In re Marriage of Dajani, 251 Cal. Rptr. 871, 872-73 (Ct. App. 1988). Enforcement
may be more likely when there is a clear rationale for requiring a substantial payment. See,
e.g., In re Marriage of Bellio, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 556, 560 (Ct. App. 2003), discussed supra
note 188.
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the legal requirements for enforcing prenuptial agreements. 22 9 Between these two extremes, courts determining whether to enforce payment of mahr or sadaq look to the parties' understanding of their
agreement at the time it was signed. 23" Although expert testimony on
the religious and cultural traditions involved may be helpful to the
court, the judicial basis for enforcement lies in the secular law of contract and is not a question of religious law.2 31
These principles define useful parameters for families who wish
to conclude marital agreements that will be legally enforceable in
American courts. A couple who intends the marriage payment to be
extremely generous might look to their tradition for other devices to
achieve this end.23 2 A couple who wishes to opt out of the secular
marital property and alimony laws might prepare a different and
more explicit agreement. 233 In order to achieve the goal of secular
enforceability, families should also consider the full range of contract
law issues, including the statute of frauds, protections against duress
and undue influence, and the financial disclosure requirements that
are routinely applied to premarital waivers of support and property
rights in the United States.2 3"
229. E.g., Shaban, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 867-69; see also Chaudhary v. Ali, No. 0956-94-4,
1995 WL 40079, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. 1995).
230. E.g. Akileh, 666 So. 2d at 248-49 (upholding a sadaqbased on contractual principles
where the husband did not make known his "unique understanding" of the agreement at
the time of negotiations).
231. See id. at 247, 249 (using contractual principles to reach a decision-rather than
the testimony of the plaintiff's expert).
232. This might be achieved through a larger gift at the time of the marriage, treated as
the prompt portion of the mahr, which would no longer be subject to legal dispute at the
time of a divorce.
233. See, e.g., Mehtar v. Mehtar, No. FA 9600800075, 1997 WL 576540, at *1 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Sept. 5, 1997) (upholding that the parties' premarital agreement, executed in
South Africa, which was "intended to give effect to their religious beliefs by opting out of
the community property provisions of South African marital law"); see also Fernandez v.
Fernandez, 194 Cal. App. 3d 782 (1961) (giving effect to choice of law provision in Mexican prenuptial agreement).
234. See CLARK, supra note 7, at 1-10 (outlining basic contract principles applied to premarital agreement); see also UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT, 9C U.L.A. 35 (2001). Some
form of the Act is in effect in 25 states and the District of Columbia. Id. In California, the
Act was recently amended to require that a party who waives spousal support must be
represented by independent counsel in order for the waiver to be effective and that a party
against whom enforcement is sought must have had at least seven days between the time
the agreement is presented and when it is signed. CAL. FAM.CODE § 1615(c)(1)-(2) (West
2004).
Conforming to the secular requirements for premarital agreements may require modification of some traditions, such as the custom of having the contract executed by the
groom and the bride's father. See, e.g., Atassi v. Atassi, 451 S.E.2d 371, 376 (N.C. Ct. App.
1995) (declining to enforce a Syrian premarital agreement over the wife's objections,
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2. Religious Divorce.-InJewish tradition, a divorce is concluded
when a husband appears before a rabbinic court or bet din23 5 and delivers a divorce document known as a get to his wife.23 6 Without completion of this process, neither husband nor wife is free to remarry
under Jewish law, although the consequences of this are significantly
more serious for a woman, who is known as an agunah.23 7 Jewish law
requires that the get be given and received freely: when either spouse
refuses to cooperate, there are few sanctions the bet din can impose.23 8
Rabbinic authorities around the world have struggled for generations
with the difficulties this presents for the agunah, a woman who remains "chained" to her former husband.2 3 9
In the United States and Europe today, divorce is within the jurisdiction of civil courts, and rabbinic tribunals address only its religious
where the contract, signed by the wife's father as her agent, did not conform with the
Uniform Premarital Agreement Act).
235. This is also transliterated as beth din or bais din. See Breitowitz, supra note 176, at
326-27. Halacha is the system of Jewish law that extends to both religious and secular
matters. Id. at 318 n.17.
236. The get is described in Deuteronomy 24:1: "When a man takes a wife and marries
her, if it then comes to pass that she finds no favor in his eyes for he has found something
unseemly in her, he shall write her a document of divorce and give it to her hand, and
send her out of his house." Breitowitz, supra note 176, at 313 n.2 (quoting Deuteronomy
24:1); see id. at 319-21 (describing the ceremony in which a get is executed).
Breitowitz explains that while Biblical and Talmudic law permitted polygamy and a
husband's unilateral divorce, two decrees attributed to Rabbi Gershom of Mainz in the
Tenth Century abolished polygamy and prohibited a husband from divorcing his wife without her consent in most circumstances. Id. at 322-23. The contemporary get process reflects this mutual consent requirement. Id. Although the bet din does not issue or decree
the divorce, the formalities of drafting and delivering the document cannot practically be
accomplished without rabbinical supervision. Id. at 320.
237. Id. at 313. Under Jewish law, the agunah commits adultery if she cohabits with
another man, and any child she bears carries a stigma of illegitimacy (mamzer) that continues for generations and bars the child and his or her descendants from marrying other
Jews. Id. at 323-24 & n.48. A married man is not guilty of adultery if he cohabits with
another woman, and any children from such a relationship are not mamzerim. Id. at 316-18,
322-26, 324; see also Lisa Zornberg, Beyond the Constitution:Is the New York Get Legislation Good
Law? 15 PACE L. REv. 703, 704-05, 713-20 (1995). Zornberg describes a number of organizations formed to address the get/agunahproblem and assistJewish women in these different circumstances.
238. Breitowitz, supra note 176, at 329-38. A get given under the compulsion of a civil
court order is invalid under Jewish law. See id. at 359-61. Rabbinic courts have limited
sanctions they can impose on a recalcitrant husband. See id. at 329-38; Zornberg, supra
note 237, at 709-13.
239. Zornberg, supra note 237, at 705. In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks in
New York, one additional difficulty for Jewish women who lost spouses was the prospect of
being agunah and unable to remarry without sufficient proof under religious law to establish their husbands' death. Joshua Harris Prager, For Some Jews, 'Missing' Is Not 'Presumed
Dead',WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 2001, at Bi, available at 2001 WL-WSJ 2878260.
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dimension.2 4 ° For observant Jews, however, divorce requires both
types of proceedings. Courts in the United States and other countries241 have considered the problem of the agunah in civil divorce
cases, usually when a husband has refused to deliver a get in order to
coerce his wife into making significant concessions on other disputed
matters. 24 2 In a number of these cases, courts have relied on contract
theories as a basis for ordering a recalcitrant spouse to appear before
the bet din to deliver or accept a get. When the parties' separation
agreement includes express promises regarding a get, courts have ordered specific performance.2 43 In other cases, courts have held that
the parties' execution of a religious premarital agreement, or ketubah,
reciting the words "according to the law of Moses and Israel," gave rise
to an implied promise to grant or receive a get in the event of a civil
divorce. 244 These are controversial decisions, however, and other
courts have refused to grant relief in these cases on First Amendment

240. Novak, supra note 60, at 1065-68.
241. See Michael Freeman, Law, Religion and the State: The Get Revisited, in FAMILIES
ACROSS FRONTIERS, supra note 50, at 361, 365-72 (describing get cases from secular courts in
England, the United States, Australia, Germany, France, and the Netherlands).
242. See Perl v. Perl, 512 N.Y.S.2d 372, 374-75 (App. Div. 1987) (considering a claim of
economic duress in this situation). In rarer cases, a wife refuses to cooperate; see, e.g.,
Rubin v. Rubin, 348 N.Y.S.2d 61, 67-68 (Fam. Ct. 1973) (enforcing a promise in a separation agreement that made the wife's receipt of alimony payments conditional on her cooperation in obtaining a get).
243. E.g., Waxstein v. Waxstein, 395 N.Y.S.2d 877, 879-81 (Sup. Ct. 1976), affd, 394
N.Y.S.2d 253 (App. Div. 1977); see also Rubin, 348 N.Y.S.2d at 68. See generally Breitowitz,
supra note 176, at 340-342.
244. E.g., In re Marriage of Goldman, 554 N.E.2d 1016 (I11. Ct. App. 1990); Minkin v.
Minkin, 434 A.2d 665 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1981); Stern v. Stem, 5 Fam. L. Rep. 2810 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1979). There is a strong dissent in Goldman, 554 N.E.2d at 1025 (Johnson, J.,
dissenting). See generally Breitowitz, supra note 176, at 343-46. More recently, the court in
Mayer-Kolker v. Kolker, 819 A.2d 17, 20-21 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2003) held that it could not determine legal effect of ketuba where there was no evidence as to the precise terms of the
agreement or to what Mosaic law would require if it were applied to parties' dispute.
The implied contract approach raises substantial contract law issues in addition to the
first amendment concerns. See Breitowitz, supra note 176, at 346-50. Of particular concern
in Goldman is the fact that husband and wife, who were married in a Reconstructionist
Jewish ceremony but signed an Orthodox ketuba purchased at a bookstore, disputed
whether they had intended the document to be legally binding and whether they intended
to have their marriage governed by the strict Orthodox tradition. Although neither was
Orthodox at the time of their marriage, the wife became Orthodox several years later.
Husband testified that he viewed the ketuba as merely "poetry or art," and that he was a
liberal Jew and "abhorred the practices of Orthodox Jews, whom he characterized as "discriminatory, repulsive, and 'antimodern'." Goldman, 554 N.E.2d at 1023. The court concluded however, that his dislike of Orthodox tradition did not amount to a "religious
belief" and that the order to appear before the bet din did not require him to "engage in
any act of worship or to express any religious belief." Id. at 1023-24.
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grounds.2 45 The problem is compounded by Jewish law, which holds
that a get entered under the compulsion of a civil court decree is inva246
lid because a get must be given voluntarily.
In response to these difficulties, the ketubah used by the Conservative movement since the 1950s has included specific language placing
jurisdiction over marital disputes with a bet din.24 7 In Avitzur v.
Avitzur,2 48 after a husband refused to appear before the bet din or to
provide his wife with a get, she sought specific performance of this
term in their ketubah.2 49 The husband objected on the basis that an
order enforcing the agreement would "violate the constitutional prohibition against excessive entanglement between church and State,
because the court must necessarily intrude upon matters of religious
doctrine and practice.

2 50

The New York Court of Appeals disagreed,

concluding that the case could "be decided solely upon the application of neutral principles of contract law, without reference to any
religious principle." 25 1 The court described the provisions of the
ketubah as "nothing more than an agreement to refer the matter of a
religious divorce to a nonjudicial forum" and concluded that "the
contractual obligation plaintiff seeks to enforce is closely analogous to
245. See In re Marriage of Victor, 866 P.2d 899, 902 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) ("If this court
were to rule on whether the ketubah, given its indefinite language, includes an unwritten
mandate that a husband under these circumstances is required to grant his wife a get, we
would be overstepping our authority and assuming the role of a religious court."); see also
Aflalo v. Aflalo, 685 A.2d 523, 531 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1996) (holding that order
compelling get would violate husband's free exercise rights). For an analysis of First
Amendment issues, see generally Breitowitz, supra note 176, at 350-59 and Kent Greenawalt, Religious Law and Civil Law: Using SecularLaw to Assure Observance of Practices with Religious Signiflcance, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 781, 816-19 (1998).
246. Breitowitz, supra note 176, at 359-61 ("The key problem in the prenuptial agreement, therefore, is halachic rather than secular in nature, and there is little the current
legal system can do to resolve it.").
247. See id. at 361.
248. 446 N.E.2d 136 (N.Y. 1983).
249. Id. at 137. The language of their agreement was as follows:
[W]e, the bride and bridegroom . .. hereby agree to recognize the Beth Din of
the Rabbinical Assembly and the Jewish Theological Seminary of America or its
duly appointed representatives, as having authority to counsel us in the light of
Jewish tradition which requires husband and wife to give each other complete
love and devotion, and to summon either party at the request of the other, in
order to enable the party so requesting to live in accordance with the standards of
the Jewish law of marriage throughout his or her lifetime. We authorize the Beth
Din to impose such terms of compensation as it may see fit for failure to respond
to its summons or to carry out its decision.
Id. at 137 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
250. Id. at 138.
251. Id. But see id. at 139 (]ones, J.,dissenting) (arguing against judicial intervention in
religious issues).
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in accordance with
an antenuptial agreement to arbitrate a dispute
252
the law and tradition chosen by the parties.
Taking both constitutional and religious law into account, Irving
Breitowitz concludes that Avitzur is "an imperfect solution" to the
agunah problem, noting that even a bet din cannot compel a "determined get resister" to do the right thing. 253 He argues that the Avitzur
approach can be successful in aiding agunah only in combination with
a reconsideration of the grounds on which a bet din can order a divorce underJewish law. 25 4 A solution has not been forthcoming, however. Legal authority is not centralized within the Jewish religious
255
community, and the consequences of an invalid get are very serious.
Within the Orthodox community, the favored approach to this
dilemma is legislation intended to prevent a party from securing a
civil divorce until a get has been delivered. 256 The get law adopted in
New York in 1979 with broad support from the Orthodox community
requires that before a court may grant a divorce or annulment to a
petitioner whose marriage was solemnized in the state by a religious
official, the petitioner must provide a sworn statement that he or she
has "taken all steps solely within his or her power" to remove any religious barriers to the other party's remarriage. 25 7 Although this solution addresses the important concerns under Jewish law, it is subject

252. Id. at 138. On the First Amendment issues with the Avitzur approach, see
Breitowitz, supra note 176, at 361-70, and Greenawalt, supra note 245, at 819-22. In First
Amendment terms, the mahr cases present less difficulty than the get cases because the
payment of money is not seen as a religious act. There is disagreement among cases and
commentators as to whether the act of delivering a get is a religious act, and whether a
reference for arbitration to a bet din involves the secular court in religious law. See, e.g.,
Minkin v. Minkin, 434 A.2d 665, 667-68 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1981) (finding that delivery of a get is not a religious act); but see Michelle Greenberg-Kobrin, Civil Enforceability of
Religious Prenuptial Agreements, 32 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 359, 384-87 (1999) (noting
that the view that obtaining a get is secular is not "universally accepted").
253. Breitowitz, supra note 176, at 369.
254. Id. at 370. He suggests another technique for protecting wives: the possibility of
prenuptial agreements that provide for generous amounts of financial support to be paid
to the wife after a civil divorce until a get has been granted. Id. at 373.
255. Novak, supra note 60, at 1076-77.
256. See Zornberg, supra note 237, at 706-07, 728-36 (tracing the history and substance of
New York get legislation); see also Freeman, supra note 241, at 373-79 (describing get legislation in New York and Canada, and legislation under consideration in England, Australia,
and South Africa).
257. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 253(3) (McKinney 1999). The law is discussed in Friedenberg
v. Friedenberg,523 N.Y.S.2d 578 (App. Div. 1998). A similar statute, recently enacted in
Britain, is the Divorce (Religious Marriages) Act, 2002, c. 27 (Eng.), available at http://
www.legislaion.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2002/20020027.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2004).
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to some of the same constitutional questions as the contractual approaches to the problem.2 58
The New York get law may be useful in preventing ai husband from
civilly divorcing his wife without also giving her a religious divorce.
However, it does not assist wives who file for a civil divorce and want
their husbands' cooperation in securing a get.259 Amendments to the

New York statutes enacted in 1992 went a step further, permitting the
civil courts to take religious impediments to remarriage into account
in determining the financial incidents of divorce. 26 0 The 1992 legislation, however, has been very controversial for the Orthodox community, which is divided over the question whether a get granted in a case
subject to this statute has been compelled and is, therefore, invalid
under the religious law.261' As commentators have observed, this result is a problem, both because it entangles the state in a disputed
question of religious law26 2 and because it discourages observant Jew-

ish women from pursuing divorce proceedings in the civil courts.2 63
Each of these attempts to unwind the tangled threads of religious
and secular divorce law has proved unsatisfactory. The most promising development has been a strategy developed within the Jewish community, built on the court's holding in Avitzur. Orthodox rabbis are
now encouraging couples to execute agreements to arbitrate marital
disputes before a bet din, in a premarital agreement that is separate
258. Many scholars have debated the First Amendment issues posed by the New York
statute, including Breitowitz, supra note 176, at 385-393, and Greenawalt, supra note 245, at
823-834. Various authorities discuss whether delivery of a get is a secular or religious act.
E.g., Breitowitz, supra note 174, at 357-59 and 394-96; see also Greenawalt, supra note 245, at
812-816. Both writers conclude that the free exercise question is problematic in cases in
which an individual's refusal to participate in the get process is conscientious. Breitowitz,
supra note 176, at 395-96; Greenawalt, supra note 245, at 829.
259. For an analysis of the limitations of the 1983 New York get statute, see Zornberg,
supra note 237, at 749-52. Jewish law limits the grounds on which a wife may be granted a
divorce; the justifications include impotence, failure to support financially, refusal to live
in the same home, physical or verbal abuse, persistent infidelity and a few other grounds.
Breitowitz, supra note 176, at 333 n.80.
260. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 236 B5(5)(h), (6)(d) (McKinney 1999). This codifies the
ruling in Schwartz v. Schwartz, 583 N.Y.S.2d 716, 718-19 (Sup. Ct. 1992). See generally
Zornberg, supra note 237, at 733-36 (discussing the 1992 subsequent amendments to the
New York statutes). See also Freeman, supra notes 241, at 373-74 (same).
261. Zornberg, supra note 237, at 733-36 and 754, 756-58. Zornberg reports that the
1992 law was passed unanimously by the New York legislature in response to the Schwartz
case.
262. Id. at 764-65; see also Greenawalt, supra note 245, at 835 ("A court should consider
the claim that a statute undermines religious law in this way, but it cannot enter the thicket
of debatable issues of Jewish law.").
263. Zornberg, supra note 237, at 762. Traditional Jewish law requires individuals to
submit their civil disputes to a bet din. Breitowitz, supra note 176, at 326. Zornberg, supra
note 237, at 765 n. 281.
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from the ketubah.26 4 These agreements are drafted carefully in order
to ensure that secular courts will give them legal effect. 265 With an
arbitration agreement, the parties begin in the bet din, and then present the tribunal's orders to the civil divorce court for confirmation as
2 66
an arbitration award.
Conferring jurisdiction over a divorce on the bet din helps to resolve the problem of the get and the agunah, but the case law suggests
that it creates other risks. Wives sometimes face significant procedural
or substantive disadvantages in proceedings before a bet din.26 7 Traditional gender roles and expectations may play a powerful role in this
setting. 2 " Because itis very important within the traditional Jewish
community that divorced women receive a get, and because the bet din
cannot force the husband to provide one, a wife may be pressured to
agree to her husband's terms. 2 69 Applying Jewish law to the substantive terms of a divorce further disadvantages wives, because the tradition does not provide for property division or for spousal support
after a divorce is concluded.2 7 °

264. See Marc D. Stern, A Legal Guide to the Prenuptial Agreement for Couples about to Be
Married, in BASIL HERRING & KENNETH AuMAN,THE PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT-HALAKHIC AND
PASTORAL CONSIDERATIONS (1996),

available at http://www.jlaw.com/Articles/prenuptia].

html (last visited Mar. 6, 2004). This book includes a prenuptial agreement, written by
Rabbi Mordechai Willig and endorsed by the Orthodox Caucus and the Rabbinical Council of America, which has been widely distributed. The agreement includes both arbitration provisions and a promise of financial support along the lines advocated by Breitowitz.
The Beth Din of America Binding Arbitration Agreement, available at http://www.jlaw.
com/Forms/PNA 2003.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2004); see also Zornberg, supra note 237, at
App. B.; Michelle Greenberg-Korbin, Civil Enforceability of Religious PrenuptialAgreements, 32
COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 359, 374-78 (1999). There is some halachic dispute regarding
the validity of these arbitration agreements underJewish law. See Zornberg, supra note 237,
at 725 & n.113. But see id. at 767-70.
265. See Stern, supranote 264. In some of the cases discussed infta, the parties signed an
agreement to arbitrate before the bet din after disputes arose within their marriage.
266. In some contexts, Jewish law permits the secular courts to use coercion to enforce
the orders of a bet din. See Novak, supra note 60, at 1067; Breitowitz, supra note 176, at 36769.
267. This is not to suggest that these disadvantage issues are always present. There are a
wide variety of batei din, some constituted for a particular proceeding and others which are
standing tribunals affiliated with one of the major Jewish groups or institutions. See
Breitowitz, supra note 176, at 326-30.
268. See SAcIHAR, supra note 48, at 57-61 (describing the agunah problem and special
pressures on women in the Orthodox Jewish tradition).
269. E.g., Perl v. Perl, 512 N.Y.S.2d 372, 374 (App. Div. 1987) (considering a claim in
which a get was used as leverage against the wife).
270. See Breitowitz, supra note 176, at 371. A traditional ketubah requires a husband who
divorces his wife to make a one-time payment of "200 zuz," which translates to a value of
about $320. Id. at 371 & n.260. A husband who has not given his wife a get may be compelled to pay spousal support. Id. at 371-72.
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Secular courts have considered allegations of duress and overreaching in cases brought to a bet din, and have refused to enforce
arbitration agreements signed under various types of pressure. 27 ' The
courts also utilize state arbitration laws to maintain some measure of
supervision 272 and enforce certain minimum requirements of fairness
and due process.2 7 3 In the family law setting, courts generally will not
confirm arbitration awards concerning child support or custody without an independent consideration of the best interests of the children.2 74 Thus, in Stein v. Stein,27 5 the court considered a case in which
a bet din had awarded custody of both children and all marital assets to
the husband, ordered the wife not to move outside New York City and
In response to the limitations of religious law, the agreements described in note 264
supra include a provision that the bet din will apply the state's equitable distribution laws.
See also Greenberg-Kobrin, supra note 264, at 393 n.230 (stating that bet din might apply
secular law to issues of property division and spousal support).
271. See Segal v. Segal, 650 A.2d 996, 997-99 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994) (finding
duress where a wife signed a marital settlement in response to extreme pressures; evidence
also suggested that bet din had not undertaken to distribute the parties' assets equitably but
had simply awarded the husband everything he sought); Golding v. Golding, 581 N.Y.S.2d
4, 6 (App. Div. 1992) (finding duress where the husband threatened not to grant a get
unless the wife gave him everything he wanted; rabbis acted merely as go-betweens and not
arbitrators); Pert, 512 N.Y.S.2d at 374 (allowing action to set aside divorce stipulation based
on husband's coercion and objective unfairness of agreement). But see Greenberg v.
Greenberg, 656 N.Y.S.2d 369, 370 (App. Div. 1997) (ruling that an agreement was not
extracted under duress where a failure to agree would have led bet din to order a siruv, a
type of communal ostracism).
272. Compare Kovacs v. Kovacs, 633 A.2d 425, 433 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993) (noting that
parties may waive requirements of Uniform Arbitration Act) with Stein v. Stein, 707
N.Y.S.2d 754, 758-59 (Sup. Ct. 1999) (refusing to confirm an award where procedure
before bet din did not conform to procedural safeguards in state rules). The same issues
are considered when a bet din arbitrates other types of civil disputes. E.g., Ghertner v.
Solaimani, 563 S.E.2d 878, 881-82 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (finding waiver of procedural requirements under the Georgia Arbitration Code when plaintiff utilized bet din to resolve a
commercial dispute).
273. Kovacs, 633 A.2d at 432-33; see In re Marriage of Popack, 998 P.2d 464, 468 (Colo.
Ct. App. 2000) (requiring that lower court consider whether arbitration agreement was
conscionable and entered into freely by parties); see also Hirsch v. Hirsch, 774 N.Y.S.2d 48
(App. Div. 2004) (denying motion to confirm arbitration award of bais din on grounds of
public policy where rabbinic court directed husband to pay $457 a month as support for
six children without considering his earning capacity when state court had previously ordered payment of $340 a week).
274. See Popack, 998 P.2d at 468-69 (requiring that court conduct de novo review of custody, visitation, and child support issues); Kovacs, 633 A.2d at 431 (requiring that trial court
make independent determination of custody, visitation, and child support issues). The
same rule is applied to other types of custody and child support arbitration. See, e.g.,
Faherty v. Faherty, 477 A.2d 1257, 1263 (N.J. 1984) (requiring de novo review of arbitrated
child support awards "unless it is clear on the face of the award that [it] could not adversely
affect the substantial best interests of the child"); Glauber v. Glauber, 600 N.Y.S.2d 740,
743 (App. Div. 1993) (holding that custody and visitation issues could not be arbitrated).
275. 707 N.Y.S.2d 754 (Sup. Ct. 1999).
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"directed that if the wife desired to move to another apartment, she
must return to the Rabbinical Court."27' 6 Reviewing this award, the
civil court entered orders granting the wife custody, child support,
and temporary financial support.2 77 It held that if the husband could
not prove that he followed or properly waived the statutory requirements for arbitration, the court would vacate the award on the ground
278
that fraud or misconduct had prejudiced the wife's rights.

Courts asked to enforce a rabbinic arbitration order utilize two
sets of neutral principles. Rules of contract law are available to assure
that the parties have agreed freely to this method of dispute resolution, and rules governing arbitration proceedings can be mobilized to
ensure that the court does not enforce outcomes that violate minimum guarantees of due process. These safeguards are especially important in light of the protective policies behind the secular divorce
laws and the difficult circumstances of some women within highly
traditional religious communities.2 79
Operating within these parameters allows the court to accommodate the parties' respective free exercise rights, and to find a balance
between extending protection to a minority religious tradition and
avoiding the establishment of religion. 2 "° Allowing these choices to
be binding enables group members to allocate to the tradition a significant measure of authority over their family lives. Careful attention
to the formalities of contract and arbitration law is necessary, however,
to assure that the courts are protecting religious choices freely made
by the parties.

276. Id. at 757-58.
277. Id.at 759-60.
278. Id. at 761; see also Sue Lindsay, Old Religion v. Modern Divorce; Rabbi and Ex-Wife Duel
over 12 Kids, Money, Abuse Charges; Case Heads toJewish Court, RocKy MTN. NEWS May 28, 2002
at 5A (discussing further developments in Popack litigation).
279. In order to increase the likelihood that these agreements will be enforceable under
standard principles of contract law, provisions regarding the role of the bet din and the
issues to be referred for arbitration should be clearer and more precise than the ones
utilized in cases such as Avitzur. Any waiver of rights under state divorce laws should be
accompanied by appropriate disclosures and signed in advance of the wedding ceremony.
Stern, supra note 264. Where the parties do not speak Hebrew, it is also important to have
an English translation of the key terms of the agreement. See id. (explaining the need to
translate the document into language that both parties understand); cf Greenberg-Kobrin,
supra note 264, at 378 (explaining that Jewish couples often view the signing of their prenuptial as a ritual, and therefore do not obtain legal advice or get the agreement translated
into a familiar language).
280. Breitowitz, supra note 176, at 380-84 (discussing the "inescapable conflict" between
the free exercise of religion and establishment); see also Greenwalt, supra note 245, at 82829.
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From this perspective, the most difficult cases are those in which
either husband or wife makes a decision during the marriage to become either more or less observant. The right of exit and the opportunity for new religious commitments are an important dimension of
religious freedom, and the get decisions have not always been sufficiently attentive to this issue.28 To allow for this possibility, courts
must determine carefully which aspects of the civil family law system
parties can bargain away in a premarital agreement. Under current
law, an agreement constraining the right to a civil divorce on religious
grounds would be problematic,2 82 as would agreements that purport
to bind the parties on matters concerning their children.2 83
Some women who choose to remain within the boundaries of a
particular cultural or religious tradition will encounter difficulty in exercising the legal rights available to them in the larger society. A married Jewish woman who believes she needs a get may not be able to
secure a divorce and remarry unless her husband files for divorce or
gives her grounds for divorce underJewish law.2 84 A Muslim wife may
not be able to collect her mahr if she decides to institute no-fault divorce proceedings in circumstances in which she would not be entitled to divorce under Islamic law. However painful, these are
difficulties that can only be solved from within the tradition and not
by the civil courts.
3. InternationalDivorce.-Courts in the United States are sometimes asked to extend recognition to religious divorces concluded in
other countries, either by a get process or in the Islamic tradition allowing a husband to divorce his wife unilaterally by pronouncement,
or talaq.285 Foreign divorce decrees are regularly enforced on the basis of comity, 286 and this respect extends to divorce orders rendered

281. See the discussion of the Goldman case, supra at note 244
282. Cf Sharma v. Sharma, 667 P.2d 395, 396 (Kan. Ct. App. 1983), discussed supra at
note 173.
283. Cf Kendall v. Kendall, 687 N.E.2d 1228, 1233-35 (Mass. 1997) (limiting a father's
right to impose his religious beliefs on his children when his beliefs were causing substantial harm to his children who held conflicting beliefs); see also In re Marriage of Popack, 998
P.2d 464, 468 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000) (finding that the court needed to conduct de novo
review of custody, visitation, and child support arbitration decisions).
284. Breitowitz, supra note 176, at 322-26, 333 n.80.
285. See generally PA-RL & MENSKI, supra note 48, at 280-313, 334-73.
286. E.g., Dart v. Dart, 597 N.W.2d 82, 85-87 (Mich. 1999); see SCOLES, supra note 132,
§§ 15.24-15.25 (explaining recognition of international nonjudicial divorces). Older cases
are collected in Note, United States Recognition of Foreign, NonjudicialDivorces, 53 MINN. L.
REv. 612 (1969).
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by religious authorities in countries where such orders are valid.2 8 v
The American case law generally requires that a foreign divorce court
have jurisdiction based on domicile, and that proceedings include notice to the respondent and opportunity for a hearing. 28 8 Based on
these rules, courts often refuse to recognize divorce decrees obtained
289
in other countries by parties domiciled in the United States.
Applying these principles, a New York court enforced the order
of a rabbinic court in Israel requiring one of the parties to deliver a get
in Shapiro v. Shapiro,29 0 as the order was 'jurisdictionally well-founded,
free from the taint of fraud and not contravening our public policy. ''29 1 Conversely, in Tal v. Tal,29 2 a NewJersey court refused to enforce orders entered by a rabbinic court in Israel where the parties
were Israeli citizens but had not lived in Israel for more than five
years, the wife did not have notice or an opportunity to participate in
the hearing, and a separation agreement signed in New York prior to
the divorce in Israel was "manifestly unfair and . . . the product of
overreaching." 29 ' Despite their international setting, these cases reflect the same difficulties and concerns as the domestic get cases described above.

287. Parties are entitled to "a meaningful opportunity to contest the validity" of a foreign court decree, including raising any defense that would be cognizable in the foreign
state. E.g., In re Custody of R., 947 P.2d 745, 751 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998) (challenging
validity of divorce by talag in the Philippines).
288. See, e.g., Dart, 597 N.W. 2d at 86; see generally Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 202-03
(1895) (listing factors to be evaluated in recognizing foreign court judgments on the basis
of comity).
289. See Atassi v. Atassi, 451 S.E.2d 371, 374-76 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995) (denying recognition to Syrian divorce obtained by husband who was United States citizen domiciled in
North Carolina); Ahmad v. Ahmad, 2001 WIL 1518116 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (denying
recognition to Jordanian divorce where parties were domiciled in Ohio); cf Sherif v. Sherif, 352 N.Y.S.2d 781, 784 (Fam. Ct. 1974) (extending recognition to Egyptian divorce
where parties were domiciled in Egypt "at all crucial points in their marital history"). New
York law holds that foreign divorces entered with personal jurisdiction over both spouses
are binding without regard to domicile. See Greschler v. Greschler, 414 N.E.2d 694, 698
(N.Y. 1980) (extending comity to divorce decree entered by court in Dominican Republic); see also Aranoff v. Aranoff, 642 N.Y.S.2d 49, 50 (App. Div. 1996) (denying comity to
rabbinic divorce decree obtained by husband who had moved to Israel where Israeli court
did not have personal jurisdiction over the wife).
290. 442 N.Y.S.2d 928 (Sup. Ct. 1981).
291. Id. at 931. Although both parties were domiciled in Israel at the time of their
separation, the husband disappeared during the pendency of the divorce proceedings. Id.
at 929. The rabbinical court entered an order for a divorce sixteen years later, after the
wife had located her husband in New York. Id.
292. 601 N.Y.S.2d 530 (Sup. Ct. 1993).
293. Id. at 535.
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In Chaudry v. Chaudy,2 94 the court considered a case in which a
husband lived in the United States while his wife and children resided
in Pakistan.2 95 The husband obtained a divorce by talaq through the
Pakistani consulate in New York, which was later confirmed by trial
and appellate courts in Pakistan.29 6 When the wife later sued him in
New Jersey for alimony and property division, the husband asserted
his Pakistani divorce as a defense to her claims.2 9 v Although the trial
judge concluded that the Pakistani divorce was contrary to the public
policy of New Jersey, the appellate court reversed.2 9 s It held that the
divorce was valid under Pakistani law based upon the parties' Pakistani
citizenship, the wife's residence in Pakistan, and the judgment of the
Pakistani appellate court confirming the divorce. 29 9 Based on principles of comity, the appellate court found that the trial court should
have recognized the Pakistani divorce judgment 0 0 The court distinguished this case from Shikoh v. Murff3 ° 1 which refused to recognize
as valid a divorce based only on the pronouncement of talaq at the
Pakistani consulate without a subsequent proceeding in the Pakistani
courts.

302

Courts in other nations take a somewhat broader approach to
recognition of foreign divorces.3 °3 Based upon the Hague Convention on the Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations, 0 4 a number of countries recognize foreign divorces where jurisdiction is based
294. 388 A.2d 1000 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978).
295. Id. at 1002.
296. Id. at 1003-04. In addition to the talaq, the husband, paid 15,000 rupees (about
$1500) to the wife, the sum stipulated in the premarital agreement he had negotiated with
the wife's parents. Id. at 1002, 1004.
297. Id. at 1002.
298. Id. at 1002, 1005.
299. Id. at 1005. The court also held, however, that the wife could pursue a claim
against her ex-husband in New Jersey for modification or enforcement of the Pakistani
child support orders. Id. at 1006-07. Regarding comity for foreign child support orders,
see also Kalia v. Kalia, 783 N.E.2d 623, 629 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002) (India is not a "state" for
purposes of Uniform Interstate Family Support Act; foreign child support order enforced
on the basis of comity).
300. Chaudry, 388 A.2d at 1005.
301. Id. (citing Shikoh v. Murff, 257 F.2d 306 (2d Cir. 1958)).
302. Shikoh, 257 F.2d at 307, 309. On the same principle, another court denied recognition to an ex parte divorce by talaq in Kuwait which no official state body ever confirmed.
Seth v. Seth, 694 S.W.2d 459, 463-64 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985).
303. See generally Alan Reed, TransnationalNon-JudicialDivorces: A ComparativeAnalysis of
Recognition Under English and U.S. Jurisprudence,18 Lov. L.A. INT'L & COMP. LJ. 311 (1996)
(discussing the validity of nonjudicial divorces from other jurisdictions in England and the
United States). For the English practice, see PFAIL & MENSKI, supra note 48, at 92-97, 38293 and POULTER, supra note 15, at 101-02.
304. Hague Conference on Private International Law: Convention on the Recognition
of Divorces and Legal Separations, Oct. 26, 1968, art. 2, 8 I.L.M. 31 [hereinafter Divorce
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on either the habitual residence, nationality or domicile of either
spouse, and where the divorce or separation follows 'judicial or other
proceedings officially recognized in that State and which are legally
effective there."30 5 The Convention requires that there be notice and
opportunity for a hearing, 0 6 and does not apply to "orders relating to
pecuniary obligations or to the custody of children."' 7
Although divorces by get and talaq seem to fall within the scope of
"other proceedings," the Convention has proved difficult to apply to
cases with facts like those in Chaudry, in which different phases of the
divorce process occur in different countries.30 8 As a policy matter, the
transnational divorce problem is similar to the transnational marriage
validation question raised by Farah.3" 9 International comity, respect
for cultural difference, and the pragmatic difficulties generated by
"limping marriages" all suggest the need for greater recognition of
transnational divorce by get or talaq, provided the other conditions for
recognition of a foreign decree are satisfied.3 1 °
The suspicion of divorces by get or talaq traces to a time when
divorces were difficult to obtain. Today, the primary issue is the ex
partecharacter of some proceedings, and the concern to protect wives
who may have little to say about the process and who may not have the
same rights in divorce matters.3 1 1 In the American context, where
Recognition Convention]. This convention is in effect in seventeen member states. Estin,
supra note 4, at 276.
305. Divorce Recognition Convention, supra note 304, arts. 1-2, 8 I.L.M. at 31. In contrast, the rule usually applied by courts in the United States requires that jurisdiction be
based on the domicile of at least one of the spouses. See, e.g., Atassi v. Atassi, 451 S.E.2d
371, 375 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995) (finding genuine issue of material fact regarding husband's
domicile and holding that foreign divorces obtained by persons domiciled in the United
States are not recognized in North Carolina).
306. See Divorce Recognition Convention, supra note 304, art. 8, 8 I.L.M. at 32 ("If, in
the light of all the circumstances, adequate steps were not taken to give notice of the
proceedings ... to the respondent, or if he was not afforded a sufficient opportunity to
present his case, the divorce or legal separation may be refused recognition.").
307. Id. art. 1, 8 I.L.M. at 31.
308. These questions have come up in several English cases decided under the statute
that implemented the Divorce Recognition Convention. See Reed, supra note 303, at 31928 (discussing application of Family Law Act to non-judicial divorces). See generally Bernard
Berkovits, TransnationalDivorces: The Fatima Decision, 104 L.Q. REv. 60 (1988) (discussing
the treatment under English law of divorce proceedings instituted in England and concluded in another jurisdiction).
309. See Farah v. Farah, 429 S.E.2d 626, 629 (Va. Ct. App. 1993), discussed supra notes
134-140 and accompanying text.
310. See Berkovits, supra note 308, at 60-61, 92-93; Reed, supra note 303, at 334-37. A
limping marriage is one that has been terminated in one jurisdiction but is treated as still
continuing in others. Berkovits, supra note 308, at 60.
311. Unequal access to divorce raises an issue under Article 16(1) of CEDAW. CEDAW,
supra note 76, art. 16(1), 1249 U.N.T.S. at 20. This has been a basis in France for refusing
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unilateral no-fault divorces are readily available to husbands or wives
in every state, the important concern today is not with divorce itself
31 2
but its financial incidents and issues of custody and child support.
In both the Jewish and Islamic tradition, the rules of divorce that
have evolved over centuries still operate to the disadvantage of women
in many circumstances.3 13 These difficulties have been addressed
from within these traditions, through the creative use of marital agreements and through new legislation in some countries. Unless these
reforms are widely adopted, however, the tension between these traditions and the practices of American divorce law will continue. Free
access to divorce is a relatively recent phenomenon in the United
States, and the American law is premised on a different view of relations between men and women and of the importance of equality in
their legal and financial positions. As American courts and those in
other western countries accommodate the divorce practices of other
cultural and religious traditions, it is important to protect against reinscribing into our family law the gender discrimination that has only
recently been ameliorated.
C. International Custody Disputes
When state courts in the United States are asked to recognize and
enforce custody orders entered by foreign courts, there is frequently
tension between the demands of comity and the courts' concern for
the parties' rights and children's welfare. As with divorce decrees,
courts ask whether a foreign custody decree was based on adequate
jurisdictional grounds and whether the respondent had adequate notice and opportunity for a hearing. In custody disputes, however,
there is the additional problem of whether a foreign decree was based
substantively on consideration of the best interests of the child. This
determination is more difficult when a court applying notably different religious or cultural custody norms issued the decree.
In the United States, the inquiry begins with the rules contained
in the uniform jurisdictional statutes that courts ordinarily apply to
to recognize divorce by talaq. See Hughes Fulchiron, Droits de l'Homme et Families Musulamanes en Europe: Quel Equilibre pour Quel Droits?, in FAMILY LIFE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 235,
236-37 (Peter Lodrop & Eva Modvar, eds. 2004).
312. The validity of marriages and divorces is often raised in the setting of immigration
law, and these cases reflect a constant suspicion of potential immigration fraud. For a
summary of marriage and divorce recognition rules applied by the U.S. Immigration and
Naturalization Service, see Daniel Levy, The Family in Immigration and Nationality Law: Part I,
92-9 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS (Fed. Publ'ns Inc., Wash., D.C.), Sept. 1992, at 1.
313. See Wegner, supra note 68, at 1, 4-7 (discussing women's inferior status under historic Jewish and Islamic law).
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interstate custody disputes.3 1 4 These statutes extend to international
custody disputes and require recognition of child custody determinations made in foreign countries "under factual circumstances in substantial conformity with the jurisdictional standards" of the uniform
statutes.3 1 5 In the more recent version, the statute includes a proviso
that a court need not defer to the jurisdiction of another nation "if
the child custody law of a foreign country violates fundamental principles of human rights."3'16 Jurisdiction to make an initial child custody
determination under these statutes may ordinarily be exercised only
in the child's home state, defined as a state "in which a child lived
with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six consecutive
months immediately before the commencement of a child-custody
proceeding." ' 7
American courts have applied these rules to international custody
disputes, recognizing the possibility that a foreign country may be the
child's "home state"3 ' and giving effect to custody orders entered by
314. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT §§ 23-24 (1968), 9 U.L.A. Part IA 639
(1999) [hereinafter UCCJA]; UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT
(1997) §§ 101-202, 9 U.L.A. Part IA 657 (1999) [hereinafter UCCJEA]. Since its promulgation in 1997, the UCCJEA has replaced the UCCJA in 34 states and the District of Columbia. A Few Facts About the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction & Enforcement Act, at
http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/uniformact-factsheets/uniformacts-fs-uccjea.asp
(last visited Feb. 15, 2004). The majority of the cases discussed infra were decided under the
UCCJA, the earlier of these two statutes, which is less clear about its application to apply it
to international disputes. See generally Robert G. Spector, InternationalChild CustodyJurisdiction and the Uniform Child Custody JurisdictionandEnforcement Act, 33 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL.
251 (2000).
315. UCCJEA § 105(b), 9 U.L.A. Part IA at 662; see also UCCJA § 23, 9 U.L.A. Part IA at
639 (applying to decrees "involving legal institutions similar in nature to custody institutions rendered by appropriate authorities of other nations if reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard were given to all affected persons").
316. UCCJEA § 105(c), 9 U.L.A. at 662.
317. UCCJEA § 201 (a)(1), supra note 314, at 671, and UCCJEA §102(7) (definition of
"home state"), supra note 314, at 658. If there is no "home state", the court of a state with
certain significant connections to the child may take jurisdiction, but for purposes of making this inquiry the court must consider the possibility that a foreign country may be the
child's "home state." UCCJEA §105(a), supra note 314, at 662. When an initial custody
determination has been made consistently with the provisions of the statute, the court
making the determination has "continuing exclusive jurisdiction" over the matter, unless it
determines that there is no longer a sufficient connection between the child and the state
or unless "the child, the child's parents, and any person acting as a parent do not presently
reside" in the state. UCCJEA §202(a), supra note 314, at 674. At this point, a court in
another state may modify the initial determination, provided that it has jurisdiction under
§201. Id. §§ 102(7), 201 (a)(1), 9 U.L.A. at 658, 671.
318. See generally Ivaldi v. Ivaldi, 685 A.2d 1319, 1323-25 (N.J. 1996) (listing cases). Cases
in which courts determined that a foreign country was a child's "home state" under the
UCCJA and declined to exercise jurisdiction for this reason include Dincer v. Dincer, 701
A.2d 210 (Pa. 1998) (Belgium); In re Marriageofleronimakis, 831 P.2d 172,176-79 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1992 (Greece); and Suarez Ortega v. Pujals de Suarez, 465 So. 2d 607 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
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foreign courts with a similar jurisdictional basis.319 Once satisfied that
the foreign court provided notice and an opportunity for a hearing,
American courts generally defer to and enforce custody orders entered in other countries.3 2 °
International custody disputes are also subject to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction,3 2 '
which has gained seventy-four contracting states since its promulgation in 1980.322 The Child Abduction Convention requires the
"prompt return" of a child who has been removed from or wrongfully
retained outside the child's state of habitual residence in breach of
rights of custody under the law of habitual residence. 2 3 The Convention includes a variety of affirmative defenses that may be raised
against a claim for return, including a provision that a court may re1985) (Mexico). See also In re the Marriage of Medill, 40 P.3d 1087, 1095-96 (Ore. Ct. App.
2002) (applying UCCJEA and concluding that Oregon court had no jurisdiction to modify
custody order where Germany was the home state of the children).
Cases in which courts refused to treat a foreign country as a state under the UCCJA,
despite statutory language extending "the general policies of this Act ... to the international arena," include In re Marriage of Horiba, 950 P.2d 340,344-46 (Or. Ct. App. 1997)
(Japan); Klien v. Klien, 533 N.Y.S.2d 211, 214 (Sup. Ct. 1988) (Israel) (dictum). See also
Rashid v. Drumm, 824 S.W.2d 497, 503 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (noting that state version of
UCCJA did not provide for international application); Schroeder v. Vigil-Escalera Perez,
664 N.E.2d 627, 636-37 (Ohio Com. P1. 1995) (same). In Amin v. Bakhaty, 798 So. 2d 75
(La. 2001), the court ruled that a state court has discretion under the UCCJA not to recognize the home state jurisdiction of "a foreign Islamic state" based on a finding that the
foreign nation would not apply a best interests of the child test in a custody dispute.
319. See Custody of a Minor (No. 3), 468 N.E.2d 251, 256 (Mass. 1984) (enforcing Australian custody decree); Hovav v. Hovav, 458 A.2d 972, 976 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (refusing
to modify an Israeli custody decree); Klont v. Klont, 342 N.W.2d 549, 550-51 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1983) (enforcing a German temporary custody order).
320. See Bliss v. Bliss, 733 A.2d 954, 958-60 (D.C. 1999) (enforcing Russian custody order
based on comity; Miller v. Superior Court, 587 P.2d 723, 727 (Cal. 1978) (enforcing an
Australian custody decree). Cf Al-Fassi v. A1-Fassi, 433 So. 2d 664 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)
(declining to enforce Bahamian court decree that "contravene[d] the jurisdictional standards of the UCCJA [and defeated] the purposes and policies of the Act").
321. Hague Conference on Private International Law: Convention on the Civil Aspects
of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 1501 [hereinafter Child Abduction Convention].
322. The list of contracting states is available online at http://www.hcch.net/e/status/
stat28e.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2004). See generally Carol S. Bruch, Religious Law, Secular
Practices,and Children'sHuman Rights in ChildAbduction Cases Under the Hague Child Abduction
Convention, 33 INT'L L. & POL. 49, 49-51 (2000) (discussing membership by accession to the
Child Abduction Convention). The International Child Abduction Remedies Act of 1995
implemented the Child Abduction Convention in the United States. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1160111610 (2000).
323. Child Abduction Convention, supranote 321, arts. 1, 20, 19 I.L.M. at 1501, 1503. A
court may deny return of the child when proceedings are not commenced for a year or
more following the child's removal or retention if it is shown that "the child is now settled
in its new environment." Id. art. 12, 19 1.L.M. at 1502.
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fuse to return the child if the return "would not be permitted by the
fundamental principles.., relating to the protection of human rights
and fundamental freedoms. '3 24 Under the Child Abduction Convention, the state from which return is requested is not permitted to "decide on the merits of rights of custody" unless it has already
determined that the child is not to be returned.3 2 5
Although the Child Abduction Convention has been widely embraced, it is generally not in force in those parts of the world in which
religious courts exercise jurisdiction over child custody matters.32 6
For this reason, courts in the United States determine custody disputes involving Islamic countries by applying interstate custody jurisdiction statutes and the doctrine of comity.3 27 Under United States
law and the Hague conventions, respect for a foreign court's jurisdiction and custody decrees is not affected by whether the court applies
secular or religious law, but American courts have insisted that they
must determine custody on the basis of the child's best interests.
American courts are prepared to recognize that religious and cultural factors are a legitimate part of a best interests analysis. For example, in In re Marriage of Malak,3 28 the California Court of Appeal
reversed a trial court ruling that denied enforcement of custody orders entered by an Islamic court in Lebanon.3 29 In Malak, the parties
lived together for over five years in the United Arab Emirates before
the wife removed the children to California. 33" Neither California nor
Lebanon was the home state of the children, but both parents were

324. Id. art. 20, 18 I.L.M. at 1503. But see PAUL R. BEAUMONT & PETER E. McELEAVY, THE
172-76 (1999) (noting that this
provision "has now nearly faded without a trace").
325. Child Abduction Convention, supra note 321, art. 16, 18 I.L.M. at 1503; see also
Hague Conference on Private International Law, Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable
Law: Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in Respect of Parental Responsibility
and Measures for the Protection of Children, Oct. 19, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1391 (1996). The
Child Protection Convention addresses jurisdiction and enforcement of custody judgments; it has gone into effect in twenty-seven nations. See Full Status Report on Convention
#34, at http://www.hcch.net/e/status/stat34e.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2004). See generally
Linda Silberman, The 1996 Hague Convention on the Protection of Children: Should the United
States Join?, 34 FAM. L.Q. 239, 246-50 (2000) (comparing the 1996 Convention with provisions of U.S. law).
326. But see Bruch, supra note 322, at 54-55 (explaining that Convention is in effect in
Israel, where religious courts in Israel decide custody issues).
HAGUE CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION

327. Id.
328. 227 Cal. Rptr. 841 (Ct. App. 1986).
329. Id. at 848.
330. Id. at 843.
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Lebanese nationals and they maintained a home there.3"' The wife
was notified of the proceeding in Lebanon and did not appear.33 2
The judgment of the Lebanese court described various factors it took
into account in deciding that the children's best interests were consistent with a custody award to the father.3 3 3 These factors included the
children's environmental, traditional, moral, and cultural links to
Lebanon; the fact that Arabic was their native language and that they
had been raised in the Islamic religion; the difficulties of moving to a
place with radically different customs and traditions; and their father's
material prospects in Lebanon as compared to their mother's uncertain situation in the United States.33 4
Courts are more wary, however, where a foreign custody decree
appears to be based solely on religious principle. In Ali v. Ali,3 35 the
New Jersey Superior Court refused to enforce a custody decree of the
Sharia Court of Gaza based on due process concerns and evidence
that under the law applicable in that court, "a father is automatically
entitled to custody when a boy is seven ... the mother can apply to
prolong custody until the boy is nine . . .however, at that time, the
father or the paternal grandfather are irrebuttably entitled to custody." 3 6 The NewJersey court ruled that such presumptions "cannot
be said by any stretch of the imagination to comport" with an analysis
of the best interests of the child, and that because the decree was "diametrically opposed to the law of NewJersey," the court would not rec33 7
ognize it on the basis of comity.

331. Id. at 843, 846-47. The husband unsuccessfully attempted to have the California
courts enforce a separate custody decree, entered by the Abu Dhabi Sharia Court in the
United Arab Emirates (UAE). Id.
332. Id. at 843.
333. Id. at 847 n.1.
334. Id. In addition, the Lebanese court noted that the mother was unemployed, "constantly moving from one place to another," and that she might not be able to remain
legally in the United States. Id at 847-48 & n.1. The wife contended that in a Sharia
divorce in Lebanon, custody of minor children would invariably be given to the father, but
the evidence she offered did not persuade the court. Id at 848 n.2.
335. 652 A.2d 253 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1994).
336. Id. at 259-60.
337. Id. This analysis was approved by the NewJersey Supreme Court in Ivaldi, 685 A.2d
at 1327 (noting that court may decline to recognize decree entered without notice and
without application of a best interests analysis). See also Amin v. Bakhaty, 798 So. 2d 75, 85
(La. 2001) (finding that the court need not defer to an Egyptian court that would not
apply a best interests test); Tataragasi v. Tataragasi, 477 S.E.2d 239, 246 (N.C. Ct. App.
1996) (emphasizing that the Turkish decree did not address best interests); Tazziz v. Tazziz, 533 N.E. 2d 202 (Mass. Ct. App. 1988) (remanding case for consideration of law applied in custody proceeding in Sharia court in Israel).
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The leading case in this area is Hosain v. Malik,3 3 decided by the
Maryland Court of Special Appeals, which considered whether a Pakistani custody order was "in substantial conformity with Maryland law"
33 9
Exand therefore entitled to enforcement on the basis of comity.

perts testifying for both the mother and the father agreed that the
applicable statute-a British colonial enactment known as the Guardians and Wards Act of 1890-required the Pakistani court to consider
the welfare of the minor child. 4 ° They disagreed on whether the
court in fact applied a best interests test, or if it instead based its decision on the Islamic doctrine of hazanit, applicable under the statute as
part of the personal law of the parties.34 t The court described hazanit
as a system of "complex Islamic rules of maternal and paternal preference, depending on the age and sex of the child."3'42 The Maryland
court noted that hazanit was in some respects similar to "the traditional maternal preference" once applicable in Maryland. 343 Acknowledging that such preferences "are based on very old notions and
assumptions (which are widely considered outdated, discriminatory,
and outright false in today's modern society)," the court nevertheless
sustained enforcement of the Pakistani decree, writing:
we are simply unprepared to hold that this longstanding doctrine of one of the world's oldest and largest religions practiced by hundreds of millions of people around the world
and in this country, as applied as one factor in the best interest of 44the child test, is repugnant to Maryland public
3

policy.

These cases suggest the enormously difficult problem of translation between different definitions and understandings of what constitutes a child's best interests. Although there is general international
338. 671 A.2d 988 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996). The Hosain decision is criticized by June
Starr, The GlobalBattlefield: Culture and InternationalChild Custody Disputes at Century 'SEnd, 15
ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 791, 810-11 (1998), and Monica E. Henderson, Note, U.S. State
Court Review of Islamic Custody Decrees-When Are Islamic Custody Decrees in the Child's Best
Interest?, 36 BRANDEISJ. FAM. L. 423, 436-44 (1997-98).
339. Hosain, 671 A.2d at 989. In a previous appeal, the court had identified two specific
issues to be considered: "(1) whether the Pakistani courts applied the 'best interests of the
child' standard or its equivalent," and (2) whether the court had afforded sufficient procedural and substantive rights to the mother. Id. at 997.
340. Id. at 998.
341. See id at 991-92, 1003 (describing the conflicting expert testimony); see also id. at
1001, 1004-05 (describing right of hazanit).
342. Id. at 1004.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 1004-05. A dissenting opinion disagreed that the Pakistani order was in fact
based on a best interests analysis. Id. at 1011, 1016-21 (Hollander, J., dissenting).
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agreement that a best interests test is appropriate, the standard clearly
has different meanings in different places.3 4 5 Despite these wide differences, it remains the only common denominator of international
custody law. Judges have no further guidance in determining what
best interests should mean in an international or cross-cultural
context.
Under United States custody jurisdiction law, a court need not
defer to a foreign court if the child custody law of that country "violates fundamental principles of human rights. 34 6 Under the Child
Abduction Convention, a child need not be returned to the state of
habitual residence when return "would not be permitted by the fundamental principles . . . relating to the protection of human rights and

fundamental freedoms. ' 34 7 Because the child's right to have a custody
determination based on his or her best interests is one of the fundamental principles of the CRC,34 8 the obligation to return a child also
depends upon the court's determination of whether a foreign court
34 9
has applied, or will apply, a best interests test.
In addition, there is another human rights dimension to these
disputes. Laws that do not give men and women "[t]he same rights
and responsibilities as parents" violate both the principles of
CEDAW3 50 and other human rights agreements that prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex. 351 Hosain, like other difficult international
custody cases, involved a mother who fled to the United States and
invoked the jurisdiction of its courts in order to avoid litigating custody under laws likely to favor the father. 52 In Pakistan, the mother's
claim for custody was jeopardized because she began living with another man shortly after leaving her husband, and because she appeared in the Pakistani proceeding only through counsel.3 5 3 Another
345. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
346. See supra note 316 and accompanying text.
347. See supra note 324 and accompanying text.
348. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
349. See Bruch, supra note 322, at 54-55. But see BEAUMONT & McELEAV, supra note 324,
at 174-75 (noting that parties have not successfully raised the argument in United States
cases). Very few of the countries with Islamic personal law systems are members of the
Child Abduction Convention at present, and Carol Bruch has argued that the United
States should exercise caution in accepting accessions to the convention from countries
with legal systems that pose these human rights concerns. Bruch, supra note 322, at 51-55.
350. See CEDAW, supra note 76, art. 16, 1249 U.N.T.S. at 20 (mandating gender equality
in family matters).
351. E.g., UDHR, supra note 71, art. 16; ICCPR, supra note 72, art. 23, 999 U.N.T.S. at
179; ICESCR, supra note 73, art. 10, 993 U.N.T.S. at 7.
352. Hosain v. Malik, 671 A.2d 988, 990-91 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996).
353. Id. Hosain argued that she would have been considered an apostate and disqualified for custody on that basis. Id. at 1004. Additionally, she contended that she could have
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international case, Amin v. Bakhaty,354 was brought by an Egyptian woman married to an anesthesiologist who was domiciled in, and is a
citizen of, the United States.3 5 The wife and their child lived in
Egypt, but traveled to America for a visit with her family.35 6 After they
arrived, the husband returned to Egypt, where he secured an ex parte
divorce, filed for a "declaratory judgment of permanent custody," and
had his wife prosecuted and convicted for removing the child from
Egypt without his permission. 5 7 An argument could be made on the
facts of Hosain and Amin that returning these mothers and children to
their home countries, to face custody proceedings based on discriminatory laws and also sanctions for conduct that defies the gendered
cultural norms of their societies, would violate their fundamental
358
human rights.
The international custody cases pose a particularly difficult challenge because courts must balance competing values of international
law. Respect for the jurisdiction and sovereignty of other nations may
be in conflict with the norms of human rights, particularly with respect to gender equality. Reference to the child's welfare or best interests does not resolve the dilemma, because these standards may be
very differently understood in different places.
Family law disputes on a global scale are further complicated by
the problem of citizenship. To the extent that rules of other countries

been arrested for adultery if she had returned to Pakistan to participate in the hearing. Id.
at 1006.
354. 798 So. 2d 75 (La. 2001).
355. Id. at 77-78.
356. Id. at 78.
357. Id. Under the circumstances, the court in Amin declined to defer to the jurisdiction of the Egyptian courts, but this is difficult to square with the provisions of the UCCJA.
See id. at 80-88 (finding that Egypt was both the home state of and the state with the most
significant ties to the child, but ruling that Louisiana had jurisdiction because Egypt would
not consider the best interests of the child).
358. See id. at 77-80; Hosain, 671 A.2d at 992; see also Bruch, supra note 322, at 51-55.
Citizenship is another factor in these cases. See Amin, 798 So. 2d at 84 n.15. Courts
seem more inclined to take jurisdiction in cases brought by American citizens or those
involving parties who have lived in the United States for a long time. See In re Marriage of
Horiba, 950 P.2d 340, 341, 346 (Or. Ct. App. 1997) (exercising jurisdiction where the
mother was a United States citizen); Tataragasi v. Tataragasi, 477 S.E.2d 239, 240, 246
(N.C. Ct. App. 1996) (same); Ali v. Ali, 652 A.2d 253, 256 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1994)
(same); see also Tazziz v. Tazziz, 533 N.E.2d 202 (Mass. Ct. App. 1988) (remanding case;
mother a citizen of U.S. and Jordan). However, citizenship is certainly not dispositive;
courts have also denied relief to citizen-mothers. See In re Marriage of leronimakis, 831
P.2d 172, 173, 179-80 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (declining jurisdiction over claims of United
States citizen-mother who had removed her children from Greece); Hovav v. Hovav, 458
A.2d 972, 973, 975 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (refusing to exercise jurisdiction where mother
removed her children from Israel).
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are based on different legal and cultural standards, it becomes important to determine who should be entitled to invoke the substantive
and procedural protections of American family law. Both ourjurisdictional rules and the provisions of the Hague Child Abduction Convention limit the remedies available to a parent who removes his or her
child from the child's habitual residence and then invokes the jurisdiction of a foreign court. 359 This approach, however, seems less equitable in cases such as Amin and Chaudry in which individuals who have
chosen to live and work in the United States for an extended period
of time, leaving a spouse and children in another country, ask American courts to limit the entitlements of those family members to what
would be available 0 under the laws of the country where they have
36

been left behind.

III.

DIALOGUE, ACCOMMODATION, AND CHANGE

In his work on legal traditions, H. Patrick Glenn describes an accelerating process of exchange between different legal traditions, facilitated by processes of globalization and development.3 6' Modern
means of transportation allow people of other traditions to settle
" [w] ithin the geographical areas where western tradition has been developed," and modern communications link individuals within a given
tradition and accelerate contact amongst traditions. 3 62 Glenn emphasizes that "[g]lobalization, in whatever form, implies the extension of
traditions beyond the states in whose form they may have crystalized."'6 Glenn suggests a vision of the state as "a place of overlapping
traditions," and predicts that "[w]e may see more internal choice of
law; we may see more in the way of personal laws . . .; we may see

more explicit legal recognition of social identities (that is, traditions);
we may see state support of a broader range of identities and
traditions."3 6 4
359. See Hosain, 671 A.2d at 1009-11. Hosain's claim was complicated by the facts that
both mother and father were citizens of Pakistan and domiciled in Pakistan before the
dispute began. Id. at 990; see also In re Marriage of Malak, 227 Cal. Rptr. 841 (Ct. App.
1986) (declining jurisdiction over claims of Lebanese mother who removed children to
California).
360. See Amin, 798 So. 2d at 80-88, discussed supra notes 354-357; Chaudry v. Chaudry,
388 A.2d 1000, 1005 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978), discussed supra notes 294-300.
361. GLENN, supra note 52, at 30-53. Glenn suggests "globalization" is not only a process
of expanding western influence, noting also the expansion of Islam and the spread of
Asian management techniques. Id. at 47-48.
362. Id. at 30-41.
363. Id. at 49.
364. Id. at 53.
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As these cases are decided, judges are, in effect, practicing comparative law in the trenches of family court, developing the "internal
choice of law" principles that Glenn suggests are necessary when traditions co-exist. In some cases, the traditions of the common law provide a ready framework for assimilation of the legal principles and
practices of other traditions. Our marriage validation rules can be
readily adapted to the traditions or ceremonies of Hindu or Islamic
weddings. The discretion to determine property division and support
awards on divorce provides latitude for enforcement of financial provisions in traditional premarital agreements. Consideration of children's best interests allows a wide range of variables to factor into the
calculation of parental responsibilities. Other cases are more difficult,
and courts are more noticeably cautious when asked to apply religious
law or defer to the rulings of a religious tribunal.
It is evident from the family law cases that our legal tradition is
not infinitely flexible and accommodating, and that there are limits to
the pluralist approach. As they determine how far to embrace distinct
cultural practices within the larger legal tradition, American courts
adhere to a few fundamental principles. Norms of due process establish one important baseline.36 Courts limit their recognition of foreign divorce or custody orders to circumstances in which there has
been notice and an opportunity for a hearing,3 66 and they will not
enforce arbitration awards unless the parties follow or appropriately
waive procedural requirements for arbitration.3 6 7 Nondiscrimination
principles are also fundamental, and orders that are explicitly based
368
on race, sex, or religious affiliation are equally subject to challenge.
The familiar tension between free exercise and nonestablishment
principles presents courts with an unusual challenge in some cases:
facilitating family practices that have a religious basis without presuming to resolve religious disputes or to order performance of religious
acts, and without denying an individual the freedom to exit from a
traditional religious and family milieu.3 6 9
Other fundamental principles follow from the courts' understanding of their function in family law matters. Many of these flow
from the "protective function" of family law.3 70 This principle is given
expression in the best interests test that may limit the respect ex365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.

See id. at 255.
See supra notes 228 and 320 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 271-278 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 104-105 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 280-283 and accompanying text.
Schneider, supra note 108, at 497.
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tended to a foreign custody award or the result of a rabbinic arbitration.37 1 It is also reflected in the background of state statutes that
define the distributive consequences of divorce or the death of a family member. 37 2 It explains why some principles given wider scope in
the law more generally-such as the idea of freedom of contract-are
more limited in the context of family law.3 73 Thus, courts scrutinize
premarital and separation agreements, or contracts to submit to arbitration of family disputes, more carefully than ordinary commercial
agreements.
Additionally, in the working out of this process, courts face particularly important questions in relation to traditional practices that are
heavily gendered. For reasons described by Ayelet Shachar, women
are particularly vulnerable to oppression within traditional family law
systems, where they face greater restrictions on their rights to marry,
their rights to pass on their nationality or membership to their children, their options and access to divorce, their financial circumstances and their opportunities to be awarded custody.3 74 Shachar
suggests that even as they face greater restrictions within the tradition,

women face more difficulty in choosing to exit from it.3 75 To the ex-

tent that religious authorities assume jurisdiction over family law matand courts
ters, there is a risk that women will remain 3vulnerable,
76
possibility.
this
to
alert
particularly
be
need to
Courts also face difficult questions concerning the boundaries
around communities and the circumstances in which individuals may
move between traditions. The state certainly cannot require that individuals remain within a cultural or religious group and subject to its
legal norms. Rules that prohibited divorce for Catholics or Hindus, or
restricted Jewish or Islamic women to traditional divorce grounds of
their religion, would clearly violate the nondiscrimination and free

371. Cf supra notes 311, 345-348 and accompanying text. The goal of protecting children also explains the limited acceptance of cultural and religious defenses in the context
of child abuse and neglect cases. See Terhune, supra note 3, at 165-67, 172-73 (discussing
the use of cultural and religious defenses in child abuse cases).
372. SHACnAR, supra note 48, at 54-55. Shachar refers to this as family law's distributive
function, and her discussion underlines the fact that approaches to these distributive questions vary significantly between cultures. Id.
373. See generally CLARK, supra note 7, at 3-5 and 755-68 (regarding principles applied to
premarital and separation agreements). See supra notes 308-315 and accompanying text
(regarding arbitration agreements).
374. SHACHAR, supra note 48, at 36, 55-56.
375. Id. at 59-60.
376. See supra notes 267-278 and accompanying text.
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exercise principles.37 7 The questions become more difficult when an
individual has committed by contract to religious jurisdiction over his
or her marriage. 3 " This issue lurks at the edges of disputes over mahr
payments and arbitration by a bet din.3 7 Respect for distinct family
law traditions and the primacy of "freedom of contract" within our
own legal tradition suggest that even long-term agreements for religious jurisdiction should be broadly enforceable. A concern for free

exercise and free exit, and the protective traditions of our family law,

38 0
suggest different limits.

Questions of movement between legal traditions also arise on an
international level. In a few cases, individuals with very attenuated ties
to the United States invoke the jurisdiction of United States courts,
evidently hoping to take advantage of more favorable rules for custody
or divorce.38 1 For women facing the systematic discrimination of
some family law traditions this exit alternative may be particularly attractive.38 2 Courts sometimes respond sympathetically, despite conflict of laws principles that suggest a different outcome, particularly
where the respondent spouse has strong ties to the United States.38 3
As courts and legislatures open a space for pluralism and clarify
the parameters within which different traditions may be accommodated, the practitioners of those traditions have responded by adapting traditional practices to American circumstances. Priests, rabbis,
and imams have adapted to the requirements for marriage licenses or,
in some contexts, civil weddings conducted prior to a religious ceremony.3 8 4 Traditional premarital agreements may be revised to include more explicit choice of law provisions and more sophisticated

377. This is also the basis for refusing to recognize a religions "defense" to a spouse's
claim for divorce. See supra note 171.
378. Cf SHAcHAR, supra note 48, at 103-09 (discussing "consensual accommodation" of
different traditions).
379. See supra notes 176-234 and 235-284 and accompanying text.
380. See supra notes 280-283 and accompanying text.
381. This is in some ways reminiscent of "migratory divorce" in the United States before
the spread of no-fault divorce grounds.
382. See supra note 68-70 and accompanying text.
383. See supra notes 350-358 and accompanying text. These cases do not address the
immigration law aspects of this problem, and do not consider the question whether an
oppressive family law regime could ever be the basis for seeking asylum. See generally Estin,
supra note 4, at 300-06 (discussing the challenges faced by women and children seeking
asylum).
384. See supra notes 112-114 and accompanying text (describing interaction of religious
and secular marriage requirements).
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use of civil legal remedies. 8 5 As this development continues, arbitration agreements designed to protect the jurisdiction of religious authorities may include a provision that the tribunal will apply state laws
on the financial incidents of divorce and tribunals conducting marital
arbitrations will come to understand what procedural standards are
sufficient to protect its orders from challenge after the fact.38 6
Thus, the process of accommodation works in two directions. Debate is ongoing within these traditions about the boundaries and relationship between civil and religious law and the desirability of
harmonizing the two systems. Just as some scholars are working to
develop contemporary Islamic marriage contracts that address woto
men's needs in a religious context,"' others are looking for ways 388
resolve the problem of the agunah from within the Jewish tradition.
At the international level, there is a similar process of dialogue about
international human rights and the circumstances and traditions of
particular cultural groups.3 89 Many Islamic nations have shown great
creativity in recent generations in the development of new principles
of family law within the larger framework of their religious
tradition.3 9 °
This fluidity within and between traditions enhances the process
of dialogue and change. Opportunities for exit and choice that can
385. See supra notes 219-234 (describing adaptation of Islamic marriage agreements to
United States law); see supra notes 278-283 (describing modifications to Jewish marital
agreements).
386. See supra notes 223-227 and accompanying text; see also Stern, supra note 264. Even
at an international level, courts deciding custody disputes may learn to formulate their
rulings to satisfy the demands of comity. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Malak, 227 Cal. Rptr. at
848 discussed supra at notes 328-334 and accompanying text; see also Moussa Abou Ramadan, The Transitionfrom Tradition to Reform: The Shari'a Appeals Court Rulings on Child Custody
(1992-2001), 26 FORDHAM INT'L. LJ. 595 (2003) (describing incorporation of best interests
standard into rulings of Islamic court in Israel).
387. See particularly the work of Azizah al-Hibri at the University of Richmond School of
Law, working with the organization Karamah.
388. E.g., Breitowitz, supra note 176; Novak, supra note 60, at 1075 ("Traditional Jews...
should be even more concerned with this non-Jewish, secular remedy to a Jewish moral
problem when they... could largely solve the problem by the exercise of their own authority within their community.").
389. Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, State Responsibility Under International Human Rights
Law to Change Religious and Customary Laws, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 167, 173-75 (RebeccaJ. Cook ed., 1994); see also Andra Nahal
Behrouz, Note, Transforming Islamic Family Law: State Responsibility and the Role of Internal
Initiative, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1136 (2003) (advocating internal reform of Muslim inheritance practices in northern Nigeria to meet equality standards of international law).
390. See generally Haider, supra note 53 (discussing Pakistani developments in women's
right to divorce); al-Hibri, supra note 55 (advocating new Islamic jurisprudence); Ramadan, supra note 386 (describing changes in approach to custody cases in Islamic court in
Israel).
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be exercised in both directions help to maintain the vitality of distinct
legal traditions, and enrich the diversity of institutions and practices
of family life. 9 ' Allowing for this movement is also essential in a system that protects both religious freedom and family relations as a matter of individual right.
In her work on multicultural jurisdictions, Shachar makes a
strong argument for 'joint governance" of family law by the state and
traditional community authorities.3 92 In her vision, shared governance pushes each jurisdiction to increase its accountability and responsibility to group members, particularly when individuals have a
choice to shift their loyalty from one power-holder to another.3 9
Shachar suggests "it will be necessary to negotiate the precise jurisdictional boundaries between competing authorities such as the group
and the state" in order "to best accommodate the different affiliations
and facets of individual group members." '9 4
The process described here, while it serves some of the purposes
of the negotiations that Shachar envisions, is notably different. In the
American context, legal authority is not pluralistic, and the dialogue
or negotiation that takes place between cultural and religious traditions is largely metaphorical. In family law, the jurisdictional boundaries between civil law and religious tradition emerge slowly over time
as the courts decide individual cases. With each decision, judges define the scope of multicultural accommodation, and establish new opportunities for exchange and transformation.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The growing body of multicultural family law in the United States
reflects a creative interchange between the American legal tradition
and a number of fundamentally different family law traditions. The
decisions in these cases have begun to define a framework for accommodation of diverse cultural and religious practices. Taken together,
391. See SHAcHAR, supra note 48, at 35-37, 39-40. Shachar argues that pressure to assimilate increases the tendency toward fundamentalism, or "reactive culturalism" in a society.
Id at 35-37. Conversely, creation of alternative sources of authority creates incentives to
address the grievances of group members. Id. at 123-25; see also Madhavi Sunder, Cultural
Dissent, 54 STAN. L. Rav. 495, 560-61 (2001) (noting efforts by Muslim women to challenge
and reinterpret their religion and culture).
392. SHAcHAR, supra note 48, at 88-116.
393. Id. at 120-26. While Shachar argues that neither the state nor other authorities
should be permitted a monopoly in regulation of family law, she acknowledges the greater
power of the state and has more to say about the state's role in fostering change within
subordinate groups. Id. at 129-43.
394. Id. at 128.
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the cases demonstrate both the potential for embracing these traditions and deeper values that structure and constrain the process of
accommodation. These values, which are deeply embedded in the
American system and paralleled by norms of international human
rights, include principles of due process, nondiscrimination, and religious freedom, as well as the protective policies reflected in our system of family law. Within the outlines established by these
fundamental principles, there is substantial room for members of religious and cultural communities to maintain their traditions and
adapt them to the American legal environment.
For American judges and lawyers, multicultural accommodation
in family law demands respect for these core values and for diverse
beliefs and practices. It requires careful attention to the particulars of
a dispute as well as its larger cultural context. As courts take up these
cases, however, the challenge is a deeply familiar one within our common-law tradition: to achieve pragmatic and just results in the particular case at hand, and to contribute toward the accumulation of
experience that gradually defines the contours of the law.

